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AFTER THE FALL: THE
CRIMINAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE
TO THE S&L CRISIS
BRUCE A. GREEN*
"The faults of the burglar are the qualities of the financier."--George
Bernard Shaw. 1
INTRODUCTION
N analyzing why so many financial institutions failed in the 1980s,
most commentators outside government have placed little weight on
the role of criminal conduct by bank officers and directors.2 That is cer-
tainly true of Professors Carl Felsenfeld and Lawrence White, both con-
tributors to this symposium.3 These commentators and others attribute
the widespread collapse of savings and loan institutions to a variety of
external factors, including the rise of market interest rates beginning in
the 1960s, the inflation of 1980, governmental regulatory failure, the de-
cline of the real estate market in the 1980s, and the legal restrictions on
the ability of savings and loan institutions to protect themselves against
these events by diversifying their portfolios.4
Many federal officials, however, disagree. Regulators,5 legislators6 and
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. I am grateful to Marc
Arkin, Daniel Capra, Nancy Nelson, Ronald Neumann and Jane Wexton for their
assistance in connection with this Article. I am also grateful for the research assistance
provided by Regina Metz, Fordham University School of Law Class of 1992.
1. G.B. Shaw, Major Barbara 35 (Penguin ed. 1957).
2. See, e.g., Pratt, The Thrift Crisis: Discussion and Evaluation of its Causes and the
Proposed Reforms, 9 Ann. Rev. of Banking L. 359, 359-60 (1990) (citing four reasons for
trouble of thrift institutions other than criminal conduct of bank officers and directors);
Note, The Southwest Plan and FIRREA: What Have We Learned?, 9 Ann. Rev. of Bank-
ing L. 501, 502-512 (1990) (discussing combination of deregulation and market factors as
causes of thrift crisis); Thomas, Fraud Was Only a Small Factor in S&L Losses, Consult-
ant Asserts, Wall St. J., July 20, 1990, at A2, col. 1 (most losses resulted from decline in
real estate values and high thrift interest rates).
3. See Felsenfeld, The Savings and Loan Crisis-Yet Another Analysis, in Annual
Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulations, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S7 (1991); White,
The S&L Debacle, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulations, 59 Ford-
ham L. Rev. S57 (1991).
4. See Felsenfeld, supra note 3, at S7; Scott, Never Again: The S&L Bailout Bill, 45
Bus. Law. 1883, 1885-89 (1990); White, supra note 3, at S57.
5. See, e.g., 136 Cong. Rec. S9478 (daily ed. July 11, 1990)(statement of Sen.
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executive branch officials7 have professed repeatedly and emphatically
their belief that criminal misconduct by insiders played a crucial role in
many thrift failures.8 Accordingly, Congress has adopted various provi-
sions designed to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of individu-
als who committed crimes against financial institutions and to deter
similar wrongdoing in the future. Two legislative packages contain these
provisions: the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforce-
ment Act ("FIRREA"), which was adopted in 1989,1 and the Compre-
hensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act
of 1990, which President Bush signed into law as part of the Crime Con-
trol Act ("Crime Control Act").10 Drawing upon the expanded investi-
gative resources and new procedural devices that this recent legislation
affords, the Department of Justice is now giving special attention to the
investigation and prosecution of banking crimes," particularly crimes
connected with failed savings and loan institutions.
This Article examines the legislative response to the savings and loan
crisis from the perspective of criminal law enforcement. By way of back-
ground, it briefly describes how federal law dealt with banking crimes
prior to the savings and loan crisis. The Article then looks at Congress's
belief that criminal conduct caused the savings and loan crisis and sug-
gests reasons for skepticism about Congress's view. Finally, the Article
Heinz)("the Resolution Trust Corporation reports that 'more than 60 percent of insol-
vent S&L's were victimized by serious criminal activity' ").
6. See, e.g., id. at S9484 (statement of Sen. Wirth)("There is no question... that
fraud and other crimes played a significant role in the S&L crisis."); id. at S9489 (state-
ment of Sen. Grassley)("It is no secret that fraud and other criminal conduct... have
been major factors contributing to the massive financial mess facing the Nation's
thrifts."); id. at 59498 (statement of Sen. Dole)("greed of... dishonest thrift insiders...
was one of the primary causes of the collapse").
7. See, e.g., id. at S9481 (statement of Sen. Leahy)("According to the Attorney Gen-
eral, 25 to 30 percent of all S&L failures can be attributed to criminal activity by the
institution's officers and directors."); D. Thornburgh, Remarks to the 42nd Fordham
Law Alumni Annual Luncheon, White-Collar Crime: Cause and Effect 4 (Mar. 2, 1991)
[hereinafter Thornburgh Speech] (referring to "the criminal collapse of so many of our
savings and loan institutions")(on file at Fordham Law Review).
8. There has been disagreement in government, however, about the percentage of
thrift failures that were caused by criminal misconduct. See 72nd Report by the Comm.
on Government Operations, Combating Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct in the Nation's Fi-
nancial Institutions: Current Federal Efforts are Inadequate, H.R. Rep. No. 1088, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 45-56 (1988) [hereinafter Combating Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct].
9. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) [hereinafter FIRREA] (to be codified at
various sections of 12, 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
10. See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (1991) [here-
inafter Crime Control Act] (to be codified at various sections of 18 U.S.C.). For discus-
sions of the criminal provisions enacted in the wake of the S&L crisis, see Arkin &
Massaro, Thrift 'Crime': A Target for the Prosecutor's Posse, Part I-Legal Exposure,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 13, 1990, at 1, col. 1; Arkin & Massaro, Defending Thrift 'Crime, 'Part 1I:
Potential Problems and Responses, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 14, 1990, at 2, col. 5; Baird, Criminal
Investigative Powers Under FIRREA, 26 Rev. of Banking & Fin. Serv. 19 (Sept. 12, 1990);
Glancz, Jordan & Matheson, New Bank Fraud Law May Frighten Off the Competent,
Am. Banker, Jan. 29, 1991, at 4, col. 1.
11. See infra notes 94-120 and accompanying text.
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explores several provocative aspects of Congress's response to the per-
ceived problem of rampant criminal wrongdoing at financial institutions.
I. THE VIEw OF FEDERAL BANKING CRIMES PRIOR
TO THE S & L CRISIS
Federal criminal legislation has long favored financial institutions.
Like carrier pigeons," wild unbranded horses 3 and other endangered
species, banks 4 are the subject of federal criminal provisions punishing
those who cause them harm. Banks enjoy greater protection under fed-
eral criminal statutes than do any other commercial enterprises.' 5
Among the most important criminal provisions applying to banks are
those that proscribe wrongdoing by insiders: bank officers, directors, em-
ployees and agents.' 6
The contemporary criminal provisions originated in the National
Banking Act of 1863,17 legislation mainly comprised of civil provisions
intended to preserve the integrity of the nation's currency during the
Civil War.II The National Banking Act contained only one criminal en-
actment,19 addressing Congress's concern that misconduct by insiders
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 45 (1988).
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 47(a) (1988).
14. Because federal criminal legislation dealing with financial institutions often fails
to distinguish between savings and loans, commercial banks and other financial institu-
tions, this Article uses the terms "bank" to refer to financial institutions generally.
15. Statutes of general applicability that prohibit activities such as mail and wire
fraud or extortion may protect other enterprises, but the bank statutes are among the few
that protect commercial enterprises in particular. Likewise, although many criminal pro-
visions, such as securities fraud statutes, are directed at practices within an industry, they
are not intended to protect the industry itself, but to protect consumers and others from
members of the industry.
16. See generally J. Villa, Banking Crimes §§ 3.01-3.05, at 3-1 to 3-64 (1990)(compre-
hensive discussion of misapplication, embezzlement and false entries); Arkin, A Brief
Look at Banking-Related Crimes, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 14, 1991, at 3, col. 1 (examining Title 18
statutes as they apply to financial institutions).
17. 12 Stat. 665, 675, Feb. 25, 1863. Congress repealed this Act the following year
and incorporated virtually all its provisions into the National Banking Act of 1864. This
was true of the criminal provision in particular, which became Section 55 of the National
Banking Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99, 116 (1864). For a discussion of the legislative history
of the 1864 Act's criminal provision, see Morse, Bank Insiders and the Willful Misappli-
cation Statute: Toward More Effective Protection from Self-Dealing, 92 Banking LJ. 715,
737-40 (1975).
The nineteenth-century criminal provision, as subsequently amended, is currently codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. §§ 656 (misapplication and embezzlement from federally insured
banks); 657 (misapplication and embezzlement from federally insured savings and loan
associations and other financial institutions); 1005 (false entries in the books of a federally
insured bank); and 1006 (false entries in books of federally insured savings and loan as-
sociations and other financial institutions) (1988).
18. See J. Villa, supra note 16, § 3.01[l], at 3-4 n.6.
19. 12 Stat. 665, 675 (Feb. 25, 1863). This was, to my knowledge, the first federal
criminal provision to be incorporated into a comprehensive legislative package regulating
business practices. Cf. Morse, supra note 17, at 737 ("[T]he National Bank Act was one
of the first pieces of legislation to provide an extensive set of purely regulatory controls
over a field of business activity."). The use of federal criminal provisions in connection
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substantially threatened the well-being of banks2 -- a concern that Con-
gress has since voiced repeatedly.21 This criminal statute proscribed the
misapplication and embezzlement of bank funds22 as well as the making
of false entries in a bank's records.23 Although these crimes were la-
belled misdemeanors, they initially carried a penalty hefty by today's
standards: no fewer than five years, and as many as ten years, imprison-
ment. Congress later reduced the penalty to a maximum of five years'
imprisonment.24
Federal courts have had relatively free rein in determining the scope of
the crime of misapplication. Although the misapplication statute did
reach much conduct that constituted a crime under state law as well,25
"misapplication" was a new crime; it never existed under state common
law. Therefore, prior judicial understandings have not constrained the
courts' interpretation of the statute. Nor have expressions of legislative
intent circumscribed the courts, since the 1863 Congress gave no indica-
tion of what it meant by "misapplication."
Although Congress apparently did not intend the federal misapplica-
with the regulation of business practices has been said to have originated with the Inter-
state Commerce Act of 1887. See H. First, Business Crime 1-2 (1990) (Section 10 of the
Interstate Commerce Act, which made wilful violation of Act a misdemeanor, was the
"first important 'business crime' "). It may be that such recognition is owed, instead, to
the National Bank Act.
20. The banking interest in the United States is an important one; it has grown
with the business of the country, and has been largely instrumental in develop-
ing the national resources and in increasing the national wealth. Banks of issue,
badly and dishonestly as many of them have been managed, and disastrous as
have been the failures which bad management and dishonesty have produced,
have still been of unquestionable advantage to the people.
Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency on the National Bank Act, 1864,
reprinted in 2 Documentary History of.Banking & Currency in the United States 331 (H.
Krooss ed. 1983).
21. See J. Villa, supra note 16, § 3.01[1], at 3-4 to 3-6.
22. See supra note 17.
23. Id.
24. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 656, 657, 1005, 1006 (1988)(revised in 1948 to provide for maxi-
mum five years' imprisonment).
25. To a large extent, the import of the federal banking crimes is not to criminalize
conduct that would otherwise have been lawful, but rather to extend the federal govern-
ment's investigative and prosecutorial authority to particular criminal conduct over
which the state authorities would otherwise have enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction. Conse-
quently, since 1863, state and federal authorities have had concurrent jurisdiction to pros-
ecute a variety of wrongdoing by bank insiders. See generally J. Villa, supra note 16,
§ 1.01, 1-1 to 1-4 (discussion of concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal authorities in
criminal matters). In addition, states continued to exercise sole authority over other
wrongful conduct directed at banks both by insiders and outsiders. See, e.g., Williams v.
United States, 458 U.S. 279, 290 (1982)(18 U.S.C. § 1014, proscribing false statements to
a bank, does not reach writing a check on insufficient funds); Comment on Legislation,
Bad Check Laws, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 451 (1931)(reviewing state laws on issuance of checks
drawn on insufficient funds). As a matter of investigative and prosecutorial discretion,
federal authorities have traditionally declined to proceed in many individual cases that




tion statute to reach "maladministration" of a bank's affairs,26 federal
courts have availed themselves of the license to interpret that statute
broadly. This loose interpretation has obscured the line between malad-
ministration and misapplication. As currently interpreted, misapplica-
tion does not require any taking of funds by the bank insider, nor does it
require any actual or intended loss to the bank. It simply requires a de-
ceitful handling of bank funds.27 Bank officers have been convicted of
misapplication for authorizing loans that were forbidden by civil stat-
utes" or regulations, 29 by bank internal policies,30 or by instructions
from the bank's board of directors.3 It is no defense that the bank officer
or the borrower intended to return or did in fact return the bank's
money,32 that the officer sought to promote the bank's interests, 33 or even
that the bank profited from the officer's acts?
Because courts have read the 1863 statute to reach a wide variety of
misconduct, there has been little need for Congress to adopt new crimi-
nal statutes for the protection of banks. Nevertheless, in the twentieth
century, in keeping with Congress's general expansion of federal criminal
jurisdiction-an expansion that some have criticized recently--Con-
gress modestly extended the protection that federal criminal law affords
financial institutions. It did so out of a concern identical to the one un-
derlying the 1863 statute-namely, that the wrongdoing of insiders could
topple banks. In 1913, for example, Congress enacted a criminal statute
forbidding bribery of bank officials. 36 This provision, which was in-
tended to promote disinterested decisionmaking by bank directors, of-
ficers and employees, has been amended on a number of occasions over
26. See United States v. Britton, 107 U.S. 655, 668 (1882).
27. See United States v. Walker, 871 F.2d 1298, 1307 (6th Cir. 1989).
28. See United States v. Castiglia, 894 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.)(violation of 12 U.S.C.
§ 375a), cert. denied, 111 S. CL 68 (1990).
29. See eg., United States v. Cordell, 912 F.2d 769, 777 (5th Cir. 1990)(evidence of
violation of Regulation J allowed to show responsibility for shifting funds); United States
v. McElroy, 910 F.2d 1016, 1023-24 (2d Cir. 1990) (evidence of violation of Federal
Reserve Board Regulation U is admissible).
30. See eg., United States v. Clark, 765 F.2d 297, 303 (2d Cir. 1985)(violation of
bank's internally imposed lending limit); United States v. Angelos, 763 F.2d 859, 861 (7th
Cir. 1985) (loan made by bank officer without necessary approval by board of directors).
31. Cf United States v. Bonnett, 877 F.2d 1450, 1454-58 (10th Cir. 1989)(conviction
under bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1344, where scheme led to circumvention of lend-
ing limit set by bank's board of directors).
32. See United States v. Sindona, 636 F.2d 792, 800-01 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 912 (1981); United States v. Beran, 546 F.2d 1316, 1321-22 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 916 (1977); United States v. Fortunato, 402 F.2d 79, 80-81 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 933 (1969).
33. See Sindona, 636 F.2d at 800-01.
34. See United States v. Landers, 576 F.2d 94, 96 (5th Cir. 1978).
35. See eg., Miner, The Consequences of Federalizing Criminal Law, 4 Crim. Just. 16
(1989) (discussing negative implications of federalizing criminal law).
36. See Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, ch. 6, § 22, 38 Stat. 251, 272.
The statute prohibited bank officers, directors and employees from receiving "any fee,
commission, gift, or other consideration for or in connection with any transaction or
business of the bank" apart from a salary or fees paid by the bank itself. Id.
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the past seventy-five years both to broaden its reach and to narrow it."
In the 1970s, failures of commercial banks, attributed to self-dealing
by insiders,38 led to calls for further expansion of federal criminal provi-
sions protecting financial institutions.39 The call continued to sound
throughout the early 1980s, as congressional committees conducted addi-
tional examinations of the problem of criminal misconduct by bank in-
siders." In 1984, responding in part to the need for an effective way to
deal with bank fraud,41 Congress enacted a bank fraud statute42 that ap-
plied to both insiders and others. Although its ostensible purpose was to
plug some loopholes in the existing law,4 3 the statute reaches little mis-
conduct that was not already forbidden by either one of the other bank-
ing crime statutes or some other federal criminal statute of general
applicability, such as mail or wire fraud. The misapplication and false
entry provisions, along with the mail and wire fraud provisions, continue
to be the ones federal prosecutors most often employ to address crimes
by bank insiders. Notwithstanding its limited impact, the bank fraud
statute amply reflected Congress's growing concern about the gravity of
misconduct by bank insiders.'
37. Initially, Congress amended the statute to limit its scope to situations in which
the bank insider received a gift in exchange for a benefit that the customer would not
otherwise have received-in other words, to cases where there was a quid pro quo. See
Pub. L. No. 65-218, ch. 177, § 5(c), 40 Stat. 967, 971 (1918). This limitation was pre-
served over the course of several subsequent amendments. See J. Villa, supra note 16,
§ 5.02, at 5-7 to 5-9. In 1984, however, Congress significantly expanded the bank bribery
statute to eliminate the quid pro quo requirement and to encompass those who make as
well as receive payments; moreover, the potential penalty was increased from one to five
years. See id. at 5-10 to 5-11. For the legislative history of the 1985 amendment, see
H.R. Rep. No. 335, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 1782. Thereafter, the bank bribery statute was narrowed again in response to con-
cerns raised by banks that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency recognized as
legitimate. See J. Villa, supra note 16, §§ 5.02-5.03, at 5-10 to 5-17.
38. See Le Maistre, A Bank Director's Responsibility Is to Curb Abuses by Insiders,
Am. Banker, Aug. 15, 1974, at 4; Morse, supra note 17, at 715 & n.1.
39. See Morse, supra note 17, at 715-16.
40. See Note, Insider Abuse and Criminal Misconduct in Financial Institutions: A
Crisis?, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 222, 223 n.5 (1989).
Recent federal criminal legislation has also focused on wrongdoing by bank customers.
For example, in 1970, Congress amended a statute prohibiting false statements to various
federal agencies to proscribe the making of false statements to federally insured banks,
savings and loan associations and credit unions. Pub. L. No. 91-468, 84 Stat. 994, 1017
(1970)(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1988)); Pub. L. No. 91-609, 84 Stat.
1770, 1815 (1970)(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1988)).
41. See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 377-78, reprinted in 1983 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3517-19; see also J. Villa, supra note 16, § 7.01[l], at 7-2
(acknowledging that federal prosecutors were hampered by "antiquated" statutes).
42. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1108(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2147 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1344 (1988)).
43. See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 377-78, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3517-19; The Department of Justice Manual § 9-40.410, at
9-1071 (Supp. 1989-2).
44. Congress further demonstrated its concern in 1986 by providing for forfeiture of
the proceeds of bank crimes-thereby treating funds obtained by bank fraud or embezzle-
S160 [Vol. 59
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Prior to 1987, the other branches of the federal government did not
appear to share Congress's concern. For example, this concern appar-
ently did not influence federal courts when they sentenced those con-
victed of banking crimes. A district judge prior to 1987 had unfettered
discretion to impose any sentence up to the maximum permitted by stat-
ute. The sentences meted out to defendants who committed banking
crimes, however, were generally lenient, including, in many cases, proba-
tion.45 Light sentences were the norm for a variety of reasons: these
were typically first offenses by white-collar defendants; the crimes them-
selves were non-violent; the banks were not considered to be particularly
vulnerable victims but were thought of, instead, as the paradigmatic
"deep pockets"; and, in some cases, the crimes seemed somewhat techni-
cal or in any event scarcely detrimental to the bank."6
This began to change in 1987, however, with the adoption of the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines,47 which the United States Sentencing Com-
mission designed to narrow a sentencing judge's discretion significantly.
The Guidelines mandate more severe sentences than courts had typically
imposed in white collar cases; in the case of banking crimes, in particu-
lar, the sentences mandated by the Guidelines tend to be harsher.48 The
primary factor determining the judge's range of sentencing options under
the Guidelines is the amount of money involved in the crime"--appar-
ently without regard to whether that money was actually lost by the
bank.50
Similarly, federal prosecutors considered banking crimes unworthy of
particular attention prior to 1987,1 when the Attorney General an-
nounced that financial institution fraud, along with defense procurement
fraud, would be a top white-collar crime priority for the Department of
Justice. 2 Even then, prosecutors in some districts gave short shrift to
ment like the proceeds of narcotics dealing and racketeering. See Subtitle H of Title I of
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-35 to 3207-
39 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 (civil forfeiture) & 982 (criminal forfeiture) (1988)). See
generally J. Villa, supra note 16, §§ 8.11-8.12, at 8-69 to 8-81 (outlining effects of new
legislation's increased scope).
45. See generally Combating Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct, supra note 8, at 35-39
(discussing lack of stringent sanctions and deterrence).
46. See generally id (discussing prototypical white-collar criminal and general mis-
conception that defrauding a financial institution has only minor ramifications).
47. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3581 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988).
48. Whether the Guidelines mandate sentences that are sufficiently harsh in the case
of banking crimes is, of course, the subject of conflicting judgments. See Combating
Fraud Abuse, and Misconduct, supra note 8, at 39-41.
49. See Jeffiress, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Banking Offenses, 108 Bank-
ing LJ. 60, 62-65 (1991).
50. See infra notes 136-137 and accompanying text.
51. As one commentator has noted, "Before FIRREA, a bank fraud case might have
been given to the most junior prosecutor in the office." Baird, supra note 10, at 21.
52. See Combating Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct, supra note 8, at 144 (citing Memo-
randum of Attorney General Meese (Feb. 24, 1987)).
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crimes against financial institutions.53 A House committee attributed
prosecutors' lack of interest in bank fraud cases largely to the complexity
of these cases, explaining:
These casoles are "paper" cases, which are not as sen[s]ational as a
bank robbery, kidnapping, or an espionage case, but which, owing to
the complexity of the criminal schemes devised, can be rather convo-
luted and therefore difficult to organize and try before a jury, taking a
long time with no guarantee of success.54
The initial reluctance of some United States Attorneys to devote signifi-
cant resources to these cases until recently may also have reflected a view
that banking crimes have a less serious social impact than other crimes,
such as narcotics violations. This apparently was the belief of Henry K.
Oncken, whose decision to devote his office's resources mainly to narcot-
ics offenses, rather than banking offenses, caused him to be replaced in
late 1990 as the United States Attorney for the Southern District of
Texas, where many thrifts failed.55
Since 1988, the attention given to crimes against financial institutions
has increased dramatically. The increasing focus on banks emanates
from Congress's determination that criminal wrongdoing caused the
savings and loan crisis. It is to that determination that this Article now
turns.
II. THE CONTRIBUTION OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT TO THE S&L
CRISIS: THE VIEW FROM CONGRESS
Prior to 1988, most people, within and without government, believed
that criminal wrongdoing was a comparatively minor factor in the failure
of savings and loan institutions.56 As the number of bank failures has
increased, however, the view within government, at least, has shifted.
While acknowledging the predominant view,57 since 1988 federal regula-
tors and legislators have increasingly held corrupt insiders responsible
for bringing down financial institutions.58 Government estimates of the
number of savings and loan failures caused by insider wrongdoing have
ranged over the past three years from "twenty five to thirty percent" of
53. See Combating Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct, supra note 8, at 144-46.
54. Id. at 144.
55. See Taylor, S&L Bar in Houston Braces for the Attack, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 28, 1991,
at 8, col. 1.
56. See, eg., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, An Evaluation of the Factors
Contributing to the Failures of National Banks, 7 Q.J. 1, 1-4 (1988) [hereinafter OCC
Evaluation] (discussing major factors associated with bank failure); Adequacy of Federal
Efforts to Combat Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct in Federally Insured Financial Instltu-
tions: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operations, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 941 (1987)("[T]here is still no consensus on the degree to which criminality
'causes' bank failures.").
57. See H.R. Rep. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 464, reprinted in 1989 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 86, 260 [hereinafter FIRREA House Report].
58. See id.; Combating Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct, supra note 8, at 41.
S162 [Vol. 59
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the failed thrifts59 to "at least one-third"'s to forty percent6 to sixty
percent 62 to a hundred percent in the cases of "large failed thrifts. 63
Congressmen have described insider wrongdoing, less precisely, as an
"epidemic of fraud" 6 and as an "orgy of fraud and lawbreaking, ' 65 the
cost of which has been pegged at billions of dollars.66
It is difficult for someone outside government to assess the view, ex-
pounded within the federal government in general and most strenuously
within Congress, that criminal wrongdoing by bank officers and directors
has caused-not simply coincided with-the widescale failure of savings
and loan institutions. Criminal law enforcement authorities have yet to
prosecute most of the instances of possible wrongdoing at failed savings
and loan institutions; indeed, they have yet to investigate many. Rules
regarding the secrecy of grand jury investigations,67 as well as the en-
tirely appropriate desire to protect the confidentiality of ongoing investi-
gations, have discouraged the Department of Justice from revealing any
meaningful information to the public about cases other than the few that
have already been prosecuted.
Despite the lack of publicly available information, one might be skepti-
cal of the congressional view that criminal wrongdoing by insiders was a
major cause of savings and loan failures. The reasons for skepticism ex-
tend beyond those offered by various commentators who have attributed
the savings and loan crisis almost entirely to other causes. 63
First, the Department of Justice has denied members of Congress, as
well as the general public, detailed information about the savings and
loan investigations.69 Bank regulatory agencies have been operating in a
similar vacuum.7' Because information provided by the Department of
Justice has been largely conclusory, Congress can scarcely make an in-
59. See supra note 8.
60. FIRREA House Report, supra note 57, at 464, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News at 260.
61. See id at 300, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 92 (citing
regulators).
62. 136 Cong. Rec. S9478 (daily ed. July 11, 1990)(statement of Sen. Heinz)(citing
report of the Resolution Trust Corporation); see also id at S9481 (statement of Sen.
Leahy)(citing Bill Seidman, Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
63. Id. at S9477 (statement of Sen. Riegle)("When the GAO studied a sample of large
failed thrifts, 100 percent of those thrifts evidenced fraud or insider abuse.").
64. Id. at S9478 (statement of Sen. Heinz)(quoting Attorney General Thornburgh).
65. Id. at S9481 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
66. Id. at S9483 (statement of Sen. Bryan).
67. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6.
68. See supra note 4.
69. See Hearing of the Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance
Subcomm. of the House Banking Comm., 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (June 28, 1990)(LEXIS,
Nexis library, Fednews file)(statement of Rep. Annunzio)("The Justice Department has
attempted to limit the information that Congress receives about its saving and loan inves-
tigation at every turn.").
70. See Combating Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct, supra note 8, at 21.
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dependent, informed judgment about the impact of criminal misconduct
on the savings and loan crisis.
Second, the investigations by regulators and prosecutors are at too
early a stage to permit government officials who are privy to the ongoing
investigations to reach a definite conclusion about the prevalence and im-
pact of criminal conduct. At the outset of an investigation of possible
bank fraud or misapplication-the principal crimes alleged to have
brought down savings and loan institutions--one cannot ascertain with
any degree of confidence that a crime has in fact occurred. The relevant
financial transactions are often so complicated that enormous effort is
required to determine precisely what transpired.71 Even then, investiga-
tors must often determine whether the bank officers or directors who
participated in the particular transactions were acting with criminal in-
tent or were merely inept.72 These investigations differ greatly from in-
vestigations of crimes such as bank robbery, where a crime has clearly
occurred and the investigation focuses simply on identifying who com-
mitted it. Having completed only a few investigations,7 3 which may not
form a representative sample, federal regulatory agencies and the Depart-
ment of Justice are hardly in a position to generalize about the extent to
which savings and loan institutions fell victim to criminal conduct, as
distinguished from imprudent conduct.
In addition, in calculating the amount of criminal conduct that oc-
curred at failed savings and loan institutions, Congress may have in-
cluded conduct that was not in fact criminal. Congress has often failed
to distinguish fraudulent criminal conduct from abuses by insiders that
may amount to mismanagement but are not criminal. Although mem-
bers of Congress74 and government reports75 occasionally recognize this
distinction, mismanagement has more often been equated with criminal
71. Attorney General Thornburgh commented at a Senate Judiciary Committee
hearing:
these investigations most often involve complicated paper trails leading to
highly sophisticated schemes which disguise illegality under the veneer of legiti-
mate business and financial transactions. They typically involve extraordinarily
complex transactions which must be thoroughly investigated before even a thresh-
old determination that a crime may have been committed can be made.
Thousands of documents must be examined, hundreds of witnesses must be in-
terviewed and reinterviewed. Time-consuming grand jury investigation is al-
most always necessary to obtain essential documentary evidence and witness
testimony. Complex and protracted multi-week criminal trials requiring prose-
cutors and investigators to expend literally thousands of hours and infinite pa-
tience are standard procedure. The FBI estimates that as long as four years can
be consumed in just one of these matters.
Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (July 24, 1990)(LEXIS,
Nexis library, Fednews file)(emphasis added).
72. See 136 Cong. Rec. S9490 (daily ed. July 11, 1990)(statement of Sen. Domenici).
73. See infra note 104.
74. See, eg., 136 Cong. Rec. S9490 (daily ed. July 11, 1990)(statement of Sen.
Domenici)("Sorting out the S&L crisis is complicated. It involves investigating these
institutions and their management practices to see whether laws were broken. In some
cases, it was just bad judgment. In some cases it was fraud."); id. at S9510 (daily ed. July
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misconduct.7 6 For example, one Senator supporting the Crime Control
Act professed to be "deeply disturbed" by the administration's "refus[al]
to throw the book at those who stole from taxpayers by making risky and
sometimes fraudulent investments with the backing of federally insured
deposits in thrift institutions."'  His comment, referring to "risky" and
"fraudulent" loans in the same breath, overlooked that it is not a crime
simply to make a risky investment--even one that leads to a bank's finan-
cial ruin. Thus, when members of Congress assert that criminal wrong-
doing was responsible for causing many or most of the bank failures, they
may be confusing criminal conduct with risky conduct that merely
amounted to mismanagement.
Members of Congress have also failed to recognize that not all crimi-
nal conduct by bank insiders led to financial loss, or even caused a sub-
stantial threat of loss, to the bank. Legislators have assumed that insofar
as insiders committed crimes at the failed savings and loan institutions,
those crimes essentially amounted to the theft of bank funds.7 Conse-
quently, bank insiders who committed fraud have been described, vari-
ously, as "swindlers," 7 9 "con artists,"8 ° "wheeler-dealers,"'" "crooks ' 2
and "thieves"; 3 they have been compared, sometimes unfavorably, to
bank robbers." The legislative assumption overlooks that many of the
11, 1990)(statement of Sen. Leahy)("[I]tj']s clear that fraud, and not just poor business
judgment, is a major cause of this crisis.").
75. For example, a 1984 report of the House Committee on Government Operations
made a pointed distinction between "criminal misconduct" by officers, directors and
other insiders of financial institutions, on the one hand, and "insider abuse" on the other.
See Federal Response to Criminal Misconduct and Insider Abuse in the Nation's Financial
Institutions, 57th Report by the Comm. on Government Operations, H.R. Rep. No. 1137,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1984). It noted that "insider abuse," involving self-interested
acts by insiders that were contrary to the interests of their financial institutions and that
violated civil banking laws and regulations, was not necesssarily in violation of criminal
banking laws as well. See id.; see also OCC Evaluation, supra note 56, at 2 (identifying
insider abuse as "self-dealing, undue dependence on the bank for income or services by a
board member or shareholder, inappropriate transactions with affiliates, or unauthorized
transactions by management officials."). Four years later, however, a report of the same
House Committee used "misconduct" interchangeably with "abuse." See Combating
Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct, supra note 8, at 9.
76. See eg., 136 Cong. Rec. S9477 (daily ed. July 11, 1990)(statement of Sen.
Riegle)(citing GAO conclusion that all of large failed thrifts examined in study "evi-
denced fraud or insider abuse" to justify proposed legislation dealing with financial insti-
tution crime).
77. Id at S9510 (statement of Sen. Conrad).
78. See, e.g., id. at S9481 (statement of Sen. Leahy)(referring to "the orgy of fraud
and lawbreaking").
79. Id. at S9482 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
80. Id
81. Id
82. Id at S9488 (statement of Sen. Sanford).
83. Id at S9491 (statement of Sen. Levin).
84. See, eg., id. at S9483 (statement of Sen. Biden)("If we are going to put somebody
in jail for robbing a bank, we should throw the key away for some of the people who have
bilked the savings and loans."); id at S9486 (statement of Sen. Roth)("[Tlhe mask and
gun no longer fit the stereotypical image of a bank robber in today's world of high-tech-
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crimes committed by bank officers and directors may have had no signifi-
cant impact on the bank's financial well-being. Indeed, because of the
breadth of the federal banking crime statutes, some of the crimes may
have entailed no financial loss to the bank at all.8 5 Therefore, even if one
assumes that crime was rampant at the failed savings and loan institu-
tions, it hardly follows that crime precipitated the failures. Indeed, in
several of the recently reported cases, the charged defendant engaged in
relatively insignificant conduct---conduct that, in a less charged atmos-
phere, might well have gone unprosecuted 6
Even in those instances in which failed savings and loan institutions
lost money because of criminal conduct by their officers or directors, one
cannot automatically deduce that the crime caused the failure. Although
there are too few reported criminal cases in which convictions have been
obtained to justify any broad generalizations, even the cases involving
serious wrongdoing cast doubt on the notion that crime was the cause of
the savings and loan crisis. The reported cases suggest that crimes were
committed at savings and loan institutions that were already doomed to
fail, and that while the crimes may have "hastened the demise"' , of some
of those institutions, those crimes were far from the root cause of their
failure."' In some cases the wrongdoers were trying to recover their in-
vestments in a failing institution or saw an opportunity to profit from the
institution's misfortune; in other cases the bank officers may even have
been engaged in an ultimately unsuccessful, and misdirected, effort "to
stave off the evil day." 9
nology finance. More likely, today's bank robber is an insider who leaves no smoking gun
but a bewildering trail of paperwork.... [ihe American taxpayer has become the ulti-
mate victim of the modem bank robbery."); id. at 59490 (statement of Sen. Shelby)("it is
the largest bank heist in history"); Combating Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct, supra note
8, at 39 (" 'You know there are people who are more concerned about the guy who comes
into a bank with a gun, because he presents an imminent and immediate danger that you
can recognize. But I think sometimes the subtlety of someone taking advantage of a
position of responsibility is a greater threat.' ")(quoting Rep. Martinez); Thornburgh
Speech, supra note 7, at 4 (Attorney General noting that "President Bush properly called
[those responsible for the S&L crisis] the 'charlatans, chiselers and cheats' "); see also 136
Cong. Rec. 59478 (daily ed. July 11, 1990)(statement of Sen. Heinz)(FIRREA was
"designed to maximize the recovery of funds from those who looted federally insured
S&L's and to ensure that those crooks were put in jail.").
85. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
86. See, eg., United States v. Cordell, 912 F.2d 769, 771-72 (5th Cir. 1990)(former
bank president convicted of intentionally misapplying bank funds of $5,400); United
States v. Brown, 912 F.2d 1040, 1043 (9th Cir. 1990)(reversing aiding and abetting con-
victions that were based on "mere participation in a single deed with no knowledge
whatever of the scope, or even the fact, of the charged conspiracy").
87. United States v. Rapp, 871 F.2d 957, 959 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 233
(1989).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Best, 913 F.2d 1179, 1180 (7th Cir. 1990)(S&L in peril-
ous condition prior to commission of criminal acts by officer), vacated and reh'g granted,
924 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1991); Brown, 912 F.2d at 1045 (officer's wrongdoing "contrib-
uted" to demise of S&L).
89. Best, 913 F.2d at 1180; see United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1354-55 (5th
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One last reason to believe that Congress has overstated the impact of
criminal conduct on the savings and loan failures is that Congress has so
obvious a motive for shifting the blame to bank officers and directors.
Particularly as the 1990 elections approached, legislators facing reelec-
tion-almost all of our Representatives and almost one-third of our Sen-
ators-had an interest in convincing the public that something other
than either bad legislation or inattention from federal legislators caused
the savings and loan crisis.' Although members of Congress claimed to
be voicing their constituents' outrage at those criminals who caused the
savings and loan failures,91 they seem to have designed their comments
largely to shape opinion; their constituents may not necessarily have
shared the view that the root cause of the savings and loan crisis was
criminal wrongdoing or believed that their outrage as taxpayers should
be vented at bank officers and directors. Congress's political, albeit non-
partisan, concern for its incumbent members understandably would
prompt generally inflated rhetoric about crime at savings and loan insti-
tutions,92 and, in particular, an overstated view of the impact of criminal
wrongdoing.
Whether or not Congress believed its own avowed views, and there is
reason to believe that it did not,93 Congress had to act on those views, if
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); United States v. Franklin, 608 F.2d 241,
244 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Krepps, 605 F.2d 101, 108 (3d Cir. 1979).
90. See Thornburgh Speech, supra note 7, at 3.
91. See.g., 136 Cong. Rec. S9481 (daily ed. July 11, 1990)(statement of Sen.
Leahy)("Certainly I hear, from Vermonters, as my colleagues hear from their constitu-
ents when they go home, about their concerns on what happened to cause the S&L fiasco
and what will happen to fix it. How did so much money get stolen?"); id. at S9486
(statement of Sen. Roth)(A "fundamental purposeG" of the proposed legislation is "to
augment the resources of the Department of Justice by engaging the private sector in
vindicating the justified outrage by the American people over the savings and loan scan-
dal."); id. at S9489 (statement of Sen. Cohen)("The American people are justifiably out-
raged that they are being asked to pay for a scandal that they had no part in creating,
while those individuals who do bear responsibility are not being vigorously pursued and
prosecuted."); id. at S9478 (statement of Sen. Heinz)('it is high time that Congress de-
clares savings and loan crooks public enemy No. 1"); see also id. at S9491 (statement of
Sen. Shelby)("It is time that the nightly news showed footage of savings and loan execu-
fives going off to jail."). In addition to Congress, the Attorney General has implied that
the entire cost of the S&L bailout, "now estimated at as much as $500 billion," is due to
crime. Thornburgh Speech, supra note 7, at 2.
92. Sometimes, the legislative exaggeration was by way of understatement, rather
than overstatement. For example, speaking in support of the Crime Control Act, Senator
Leahy commented:
We are very careful in the State of Vermont about how we spend our money,
very careful how we invest it. Our banks are run very carefully and very hon-
estly. I am proud to say that no savings and loan fraud happened in our State.
I doubt it ever could.
Id. at S9481 (statement of Sen. Leahy). Three weeks after these remarks were made, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions of insiders at two Vermont banks-the Chief
Executive Officer of Marble Bank and the President of First Twin State Bank--on
charges of conspiracy, misapplication, and giving and receiving bribes. See United States
v. McElroy, 910 F.2d 1016, 1019 (2d Cir. 1990).
93. Sections 2551 and 2552 of the Comprehensive Thrift Act establish a National
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only to appear credible. It did so in 1989 and again in 1990 by adopting
a variety of criminal provisions that, taken together, were designed to
promote one of the most basic aims of criminal sanctions: to obtain retri-
bution,9 4 or, as one Senator put it, "to get a pound of flesh from those
who committed fraud."95 Congress's design seems to have been to en-
sure that retribution was visited on S&L directors and officers, not on
legislators. While it might have been prudent in 1990 to focus on the
regulation and supervision of financial institutions,96 spotlighting crime
and punishment was the politically expedient thing for Congress.9" It is
against the background of Congress's questionable premises as well as its
questionable motivations that the bank-crimes legislation of 1989 and
1990 ought to be assessed.
Commission on Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement, which is di-
rected to examine and identify the origin and causes of the problems in the savings and
loan industry. See Crime Control Act, supra note 10, § 2552(1), 104 Stat. at 4889. The
statute lists a number of possible causes for the Commission to consider, of which "un-
precedented fraud and abuse by persons in or connected with savings and loan associa-
tions" is the sixth of seven. See id.
94. See, e.g., 136 Cong. Rec. S9488 (daily ed. July 11, 1990)(statement of Sen. San-
ford)("The American people have made it very clear that if they are being asked to foot
the bill for the S&L crisis, at the very minimum the Government owes them swift and
tough action to put those responsible in jail."). But see id. at S9491 (statement of Sen.
Shelby)(legislation "creates a new, strong deterrent to white collar crime by authorizing
life imprisonment for 'S&L kingpins' ").
95. Id. at S9490 (statement of Sen. Domenici).
Senator Domenici's allusion to Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice, Act IV, scene 1,
seems somewhat ironic: it was the moneylender, Shylock, who sought a "pound of flesh"
from his debtor, Antonio, see W. Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, Act IV, sc. 1, 1.
99, while today it is the moneylenders from whom the pound of flesh is sought. More-
over, Shylock's demand for a pound of Antonio's flesh was thought to be inconsistent
with Christian justice, which is embodied in Portia's soliloquy about the "quality of
mercy," and ultimately resulted in calamitous consequences for Shylock. Whether Con-
gress's efforts at retribution will be similarly discredited or will have similarly dire conse-
quences remains to be seen.
96. This problem is now beginning to draw particular attention in the federal govern-
ment. See, eg., Administration Presents Its Plan For Broad Overhaul of Banking, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 6, 1991, at Al, col. 1 (describing Administration's proposal to allow com-
mercial and investment banks to merge, to eliminate barriers to interstate banking, and to
permit industrial companies to own banks).
97. For example, Senator Grassley, speaking in support of the Comprehensive Bank
and Thrift Fraud Act of 1990, stated:
Congress must ensure that sufficient financial resources are provided to honor
its full faith and credit pledge to depositors.
Even more important, Congress must cooperate with the administration to
ensure that the Nation's financial institutions are properly regulated and super-
vised in order to provide their depositors with the guarantee that their hard-
earned savings are wisely invested.
While this amendment does not address this issue directly, it does get to the
heart of the issue which most gripes my constituents. That is that thrift direc-
tors and officers-the culprits who misused depositors' trust and who abused
Federal guarantees-are prosecuted swiftly and to the fullest extent of the law.
136 Cong. Rec. S9488-89 (daily ed. July 11, 1990).
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III. S&L PROSECUTIONS AND RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
A. The Ascendancy of Banking Crimes on the Prosecutorial Agenda
Congress invoked its emphatic rhetoric about the impact of criminal
conduct on the financial health of banks to justify both the criminal pro-
visions of FIRREA95 and the banking provisions of the Crime Control
Act.99 In general, Congress intended these provisions to facilitate the
investigation, prosecution and punishment of banking crimes. Among
the most important provisions of both FIRREA and the Crime Control
Act are those that expand the resources available for the investigation
and prosecution of banking crimes.
In 1989, Congress authorized an additional $65 million to be spent in
each of the next three years for investigations and prosecutions of finan-
cial institutions, over and above whatever other sums were otherwise
available for that purpose."°0 Congress also authorized the Criminal Di-
vision of the Department of Justice to establish a regional office in the
Northern District of Texas-"the epicenter of the thrift crisis"10 1-to
prosecute banking crimes.t°2 The Department of Justice initially resisted
both exercises of congressional largesse; it wanted only $50 million a year
for banking crime prosecutions and opposed the creation of a regional
office. 103 As it turned out, in the year following the $65 million appropri-
ation, the Department of Justice could not spend the money fast enough
and, to the extent that new FBI agents and federal prosecutors were
hired, their impact was not immediately felt." Although the FBI and
98. See, eg., 135 Cong. Rec. S1513 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1989)(statement of Sen.
Riegle); id. at S4287 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1989)(statement of Sen. Leahy); id. at S4293
(daily ed. Apr. 19, 1989)(statement of Sen. Heflin); id at S4294 (daily ed. Apr. 19,
1989)(statement of Sen. Grassley); id at S10,206 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989)(statement of
Sen. Dixon); id at H5312 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989)(statement of Rep. Cardin).
99. See id. at S9877 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989)(statement of Sen. Riegle).
100. See FIRREA, supra note 9, § 966(a)(1), 103 Stat. at 506. This provision also
authorized the expenditure of $10 million a year from 1990 to 1992 "for purposes of civil
proceedings involving financial institutions." Id. § 966(a)(2), 103 Stat. at 506.
101. Hearing of the Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance Sub-
comm. of the House Banking Comm., 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (June 28, 1990)(LEXIS,
Nexis library, Fednews file)(statement of Rep. Annunzio).
102. See FIRREA, supra note 9, § 965(a), 103 Stat. at 506. This provision also called
on the Comptroller General to study and report on whether additional regional offices
should be established. See id. § 965(b), 103 Stat, at 506.
Two years before Congress adopted this provision, a Dallas-based Bank Fraud Task
Force had been formed to investigate and prosecute crimes in the savings and loan indus-
try in northern Texas. See Collins, Prosecution Perspective: Dallas Bank Fraud Task
Force, in ABA National Institute, White Collar Crime 1989: Representing Corporations,
Financial Institutions and Their Directors, Officers and Employees 1, 3 (1989).
103. See Press Conference with Sen. Dixon, et al., re Introduction of S&L Strike Force
Legislation, June 7, 1990 [hereinafter Press Conference] (LEXIS, Nexis library, Fednews
file).
104. See Baird, supra note 10, at 21 (citing Oversight Hearing on Prosecuting Fraud in
the Thrift Industry: Impact of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforce-




the Department of Justice devoted enormous attention to savings and
loan cases, the number of completed prosecutions paled in comparison to
the number of major frauds said to have been committed. 05
That the funds allocated by Congress did not bring immediate results
should not be surprising." Because of their complexity, savings and
loan cases require hundreds if not thousands of hours of investigation
and preparation. 0 7 Even now, too few FBI agents are well-trained in
investigating these sophisticated financial crimes.' Nevertheless, by
mid-1990, some members of Congress expressed a substantial degree of
dissatisfaction with the extent of the Justice Department's effortsY19
Congressional Democrats in particular, viewing this as a potential cam-
paign issue, complained that the machinery to investigate savings and
loan crimes had "virtually ground to a halt," 0 that the administration
had not addressed the problem "in any realistic way,""' and that the
President was "being kinder and gentler to the S&L crooks.""' 2
Congress responded in the Crime Control Act by providing almost
105. Cases involving financial institutions have reportedly inundated federal investiga-
tors and prosecutors. As of February 1990, the FBI reportedly had more than 7,000
pending cases involving embezzlement or fraud at banks and S&Ls, of which approxi-
mately 3,000 were considered major, and of which more than 900 involved losses of
greater than $1 million. Moreover, the FBI had received more than 20,000 additional
referrals involving criminal conduct at financial institutions that the agency had been
unable to address; of those cases, more than 1,000 involved losses of greater than
$100,000, and more than 200 involved losses of greater than $1 million. See 136 Cong.
Rec. S9484 (daily ed. July 11, 1990) (statement of Sen. Wirth). By way of comparison,
the Department of Justice reported that from October 1, 1988 to August 29, 1990, in
savings and loan cases involving fraud or loss of $100,000 or more, 274 indictments were
filed, involving 403 defendants, of whom 316 have been convicted and 13 acquitted so far.
See Justice Department Release, "How Prosecutions Have Fared In S&L Area During
Past Two Years," 4 White-Collar Crime Rptr. 17, 17 (Sept. 6, 1990) [hereinafter How
Prosecutions Have Fared]; cf Thornburgh on the Record, 77 A.B.A. J. 54, 57 (Jan.
1991)(in January 1991 interview, the Attorney General stated that the Justice Depart-
ment had obtained 328 indictments and 355 convictions, with 77% of those convicted
sentenced to prison).
106. Cf. Thornburgh Speech, supra note 7, at 3 ("simply hiring more police" will not
be effective in combatting white-collar crime).
107. See supra note 71; Thornburgh on the Record, supra note 105, at 57; Thornburgh
Speech, supra note 7, at 3-4.
108. See 136 Cong. Rec. S9490-91 (daily ed. July 11, 1990)(statement of Sen. Shelby);
Thornburgh Speech, supra note 7, at 3-4.
109. See, e.g., 136 Cong. Rec. S9491 (daily ed. July 11, 1990)(statement of Sen.
Shelby)(accusing Justice Department of ignoring its responsibilities); id. at S9510 (state-
ment of Sen. Conrad)(Bush Administration not moving quickly or diligently enough);
Press Conference, supra note 103 (statement of Sen. Dixon)(investigations moving too
slowly in the hands of U.S. Attorneys and the FBI).
The Administration, on the other hand, has pointed the finger back at Congress, which
it blamed for delaying appropriations for additional prosecutors and investigators. See
Thornburgh on the Record, supra note 105, at 57.
110. Press Conference, supra note 103 (statement of Sen. Dixon).
111. Id.
112. Press Conference with Rep. Schumer, et al., re Response to Presidential An-




three times as much money for investigations and prosecutions. For the
years 1991 through 1993, Congress authorized expenditures of $162.5
million, most of which is to be spent by the FBI and the United States
Attorneys' offices."' 3 In addition, Congress adopted what it called
"structural reforms" to facilitate savings and loan prosecutions, includ-
ing the establishment of a Financial Institutions Fraud Unit in the Attor-
ney General's office" 4 and authorization for the Attorney General to
establish additional fraud task forces for financial institutions.1 1 5
In addition to giving federal investigators and prosecutors more money
to carry out their work, Congress gave them more time. One provision
in FIRREA doubled the statute of limitations for bank crimes from five
to ten years,1 1 6 thereby affording federal prosecutors five additional years
in which to bring indictments in cases not already time-barred.
Taken together, the new provisions awarding more time and money
are designed to impel a shift-from selective to plenary enforcement-in
the Justice Department's approach to the enforcement of banking crime
provisions. The traditional approach of selective enforcement, which is
characteristic of prosecutions of business crimes, and particularly tax
crimes,"' is designed to obtain maximum deterrence for expenditures of
investigative and prosecutorial resources. The Government does not
press charges every time it has evidence that a business crime has been
committed. Instead, it brings a limited number of prosecutions to engen-
der public concern about the possibility of discovery and prosecution and
thereby discourage other people from committing similar crimes in the
future.118
Even the most optimistic legislators recognize how time-consuming
and costly it would be to pursue every possible savings and loan investi-
113. See Crime Control Act, supra note 10, § 2559(a), 104 Stat. at 4893 (to be codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 966(a)). Congress also provided additional funds for the federal judiciary.
See id. § 2559(c), 104 Stat. at 4893 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 967).
114. See id. §§ 2536-2537, 104 Stat. at 4883-84.
115. See id. § 2539, 104 Stat. at 4884.
116. See FIRREA, supra note 9, § 961(l), 103 Stat. at 501 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3293). In addition, the Crime Control Act extends the statute of limitations from five
to ten years for RICO prosecutions involving bank fraud, see Crime Control Act, supra
note 10, § 2505, 104 Stat. at 4862 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C § 3293), as well as for civil
actions brought by the Attorney General pursuant to § 951 of FIRREA to obtain civil
penalties for bank crimes. See id. § 2533, 104 Stat. at 4882 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1833a).
117. See generally Rothblatt, Income Tax Evasion: Dealing With the IRS Special
Agents and Prosecutor, 10 Crim. L. Bull. 437 (1974)(suggesting guidelines for attorneys
advising clients under IRS investigation); Tilzer, What the IRS Looks for in Determining
Whether to Prosecute a Taxpayer for Criminal Tax Fraud, 4 Tax'n for L. 52, 52
(1975)('The Service itself has stated that its objective in criminal prosecution of tax fraud
cases is to get the 'maximum deterrent value from the few cases prosecuted'....").
118. See generally Department of Justice, The Investigation of White-Collar Crime: A
Manual for Law Enforcement Agencies 62 (1977)(discussing impact of publicity as a
deterrent); C. Miller, Economic Crime: A Prosecutor's Hornbook 1-2 (1974)(publicity of
prosecution results in a "beneficial fallout quite apart from the prosecution").
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gation. 19 The more realistic members of Congress have recognized the
impossibility of prosecuting every case.' 20 Nevertheless, that is the evi-
dent goal. The shift from a selective to a plenary enforcement policy
raises questions as to the wise allocation of resources. A policy of prose-
cuting every case will not deter future wrongdoing any better than a pol-
icy of prosecuting half or one-third of the cases. 12  Nor, despite the view
expressed by some members of Congress, 122 is plenary enforcement likely
to reap returns that justify its costs: 12 3 more money will be spent in in-
vestigating and prosecuting these cases than will be recovered in restitu-
tionary fines and awards.124 At best, the Government will obtain the
maximum in retribution. In part, the question is, will taxpayers be pay-
ing too much for their pound of flesh?
More important, however, is whether plenary enforcement of banking
crimes comes at too great a cost to the prosecution of other types of
criminal wrongdoing. For the Department of Justice to successfully
bring indictments prior to the tolling of the ten-year statute of limitations
119. Senator Domenici stated:
It takes a great deal of investigative work to sift through piles and piles of docu-
ments. It takes a keen mind to follow the audit trail and discover what went
wrong in each S&L. It takes a lot of legal talent to distinguish the incompetent
from the fraudulent, the unlucky from the unlawful.
136 Cong. Rec. S9490 (daily ed. July 11, 1990). And Senator Shelby commented, "These
criminals left a paper trail but one so complex, so labyrinthine that it requires a dedi-
cated, large, sophisticated, highly trained work force." Id.
120. See 136 Cong. Rec. S9489 (daily ed. July 11, 1990)(statement of Sen.
Grassley)("Let's be candid: Not even an army of Dick Tracys will catch every S&L
crook. These cases are exceedingly complex, time consuming, and most difficult to
prove-as intricate and delicate as any case the Government might bring.").
121. See C. Miller, supra note 118, at 6.
122. See, e.g., 136 Cong. Rec. S9488 (daily ed. July 11, 1990)(statement of Sen. Hef-
lin)("I am convinced that by providing more funds to hire more agents and prosecutors
over the next 3 years-$162.5 million-the American public will reap a return on this
investment.").
123. According to a Department of Justice release in September 1990, over the course
of almost two years of prosecuting savings and loan cases, courts imposed fines and or-
dered restitution totalling just under $205 million. See How Prosecutions Have Fared,
supra note 105, at 17. No information was provided as to how much of that was col-
lected, but it can be assumed that a substantial amount was not. See infra note 124.
124. Attorney General Thornburgh has acknowledged that trying to recover the
money lost by savings and loan institutions is "like trying to wring blood from a stone,"
because much of the money went into assets that have greatly declined in value. Thorn-
burgh on the Record, supra note 105, at 57. For example, one of the Justice Department's
most recent successes, which Attorney General Thornburgh said represented a major
blow "to the savings and loan crooks," Guilty Plea Set in Case on S. & L., N.Y. Times,
Dec. 22, 1990, at 35, col. 6, involved the agreement of Edwin T. McBirney 3d, the chair-
man of the Sunbelt Savings Association, to plead guilty to four counts of a 17-count
indictment. Although McBirney's fraudulent conduct was said to have created losses of
$3 billion, he reportedly is not wealthy enough to be able to pay his $8.5 million in fines in
full. See id. See generally Farnham, The New White Collar Crime: S&L Felons, Fortune,
Nov. 5, 1990, at 90, 90-91 (reporting that the first 331 individuals convicted of S&L
crimes caused $3.5 billion in direct losses, were fined a total of $4.3 million and were
ordered to make restitution of $208 million, but generally have not made the ordered
payments, because most are bankrupt).
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in all cases involving criminal conduct at failed thrifts, it must take away
many of the most experienced agents and prosecutors from other impor-
tant cases, including other white-collar cases, '2 and organized crime and
narcotics cases. Pursuant to the funding provisions of FIRREA and the
Crime Control Act, 26 new, untrained investigators and prosecutors will
replace them only partially. This will leave a substantial shortage of ex-
perienced agents and prosecutors to pursue other cases of comparable
importance and complexity over the next few years. Is it wise to choose
even more selectively from among cases such as tax evasion and defense
procurement fraud, which involve direct financial harm to the govern-
ment, in order to prosecute virtually every case of savings and loan fraud,
which involves only an indirect cost to the public? To my mind, the
answer to this question is sufficiently unclear that, at the very least, it
should have been discussed in Congress. It wasn't.
B. The Enhancement of Penalties for Banking Crimes
Given Congress's view about the gravity of banking crimes, it is not
surprising that the recent legislation enhances the potential sentences
that courts may impose upon defendants convicted of these crimes. In
1989, assets traceable to violations of banking crime statutes were made
subject to both criminal and civil forfeiture. 27 In addition, Congress in-
creased the potential sentences for banking crimes previously punishable
by no more than five years' imprisonment' 24-and, in some cases, by no
more than two years' imprisonment t2 9 -to twenty years' imprison-
ment.1 30 The following year, Congress amended the same banking crime
statutes to make banking crimes punishable by up to thirty years' impris-
onment."' Thirty years' imprisonment, to put it in perspective, is five
years more than the maximum sentence for armed bank robbery,' and
ten years more than the maximum sentence for racketeering. 33
125. The Attorney General has noted, however, that in all white collar crime cases, the
quality of investigators is "far more important" than the quantity. Thornburgh Speech,
supra note 7, at 3.
126. See Crime Control Act, supra note 10, § 2559, 104 Stat. at 4893 (to be codified at
18 U.S.C. § 966(a)); FIRREA, supra note 9, § 966, 103 Stat. at 506.
127. See FIRREA, supra note 9, § 963, 103 Stat. at 504 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 981-982). Congress also made bank fraud a predicate offense under the federal racke-
teering statute ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), which carries a potential sentence of
twenty years imprisonment. See FIRREA, supra note 9, § 968, 103 Stat. at 506 (to be
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)).
128. In 1984, Congress increased the maximum penalty for bank bribery from one to
five years imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 215 (1988). As a consequence, the potential
sentence for bank bribery increased thirty-fold in a period of six years.
129. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1007, 1014 (1948).
130. See FIRREA, supra note 9, § 961, 103 Stat. at 499 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 215(a)).
131. See Crime Control Act, supra note 10, § 2504, 104 Stat. at 4861 (to be codified at
18 U.S.C. § 215(a)).
132. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1988).
133. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988).
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Increasing the maximum penalties for banking violations does not
guarantee that the sentencing judge will in fact impose higher sentences;
at most, it expands her discretion.a 4 Moreover, in most prosecutions for
banking crimes, it will matter little whether the maximum sentence per-
mitted under a criminal statute is five years, twenty years or thirty years.
The prosecution can almost always obtain an indictment on multiple
counts, guaranteeing that, if the defendant is convicted, the sentencing
judge will have authority to impose a substantial sentence.
As noted earlier,I35 the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are of the great-
est significance in determining the severity of the sentence actually im-
posed on a defendant convicted of banking crimes. Recognizing this,
Congress has instructed the United States Sentencing Commission to
adopt guidelines guaranteeing lengthy periods of incarceration for de-
fendants convicted of banking violations "that substantially jeopardizeD
the safety and soundness of a federally insured financial institution"'' 36 or
from which the defendant derived more than $1 million in gross
receipts. 137
Additionally, in 1990 Congress adopted a new criminal provision pat-
terned on the "drug kingpin statute"'' 38 to deal with the most serious
offenders. The new law makes it a crime to operate a "continuing finan-
cial crimes enterprise.' 1 39 In essence, the statute applies to anyone who
organizes, manages or supervises at least four other individuals in carry-
ing out a series of banking violations in which $5 million or more in gross
receipts is amassed within a two-year period. The penalty for so-called
"S&L kingpins" ranges from ten years' to life imprisonment."4
What was Congress's purpose in raising the potential sentences for
banking crimes? To some extent, it sought to deter people from commit-
ting these crimes in the future. ' 4 ' To a larger extent, however, members
134. See Hayes, Texan Gets Five Years in Big S.&L Collapse, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3,
1991, at D7, cols. 1-2. In April 1991, a district judge in Dallas sentenced Don R. Dixon,
owner of the Vernon Savings and Loan Association, to three five-year prison terms to be
served concurrently for "defrauding regulators, illegally spending depositors' money and
other misdeeds as the owner of Vernon." Id. at DI, col. 5. Mr. Dixon is eligible for
parole in December 1992. Id. The judge could have sentenced Mr. Dixon to 120 years'
imprisonment. See id. Federal officials were clearly surprised by the sentence. See id.; cf
United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 95 (1941)(noting that increased maximum penal-
ties under the National Industrial Recovery Act "gave a range for judicial sentences ac-
cording to the circumstances and gravity of particular violations").
135. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
136. See FIRREA, supra note 9, § 961(m), 103 Stat. at 501 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 994).
137. See Crime Control Act, supra note 10, § 2507(a), 104 Stat. at 4862 (to be codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 994).
138. See Pub. L. No. 91-513, Title II, § 408, 84 Stat. 1236, 1268 (1970) (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 848 (1988)).
139. Crime Control Act, supra note 10, § 2510(a), 104 Stat. at 4863 (to be codified at
18 U.S.C. ch. 11).
140. See id.
141. See, e.g., 136 Cong. Rec. S9488 (daily ed. July 11, 1990)(statement of Sen. Hef-
lin)(proposed legislation will "send a signal to those in the future who may be tempted to
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of Congress saw these provisions as an important part of the legislative
effort toward retributive justice. They believed, or at least professed to
believe, that the enhanced statutory penalties, the amendments to the
Sentencing Guidelines and the kingpin provision would lead to stiffer
sentences in the cases of those who were responsible for the S&L crisis. 42
In truth, however, these provisions can make no direct contribution to-
ward that effort because, under the ex post facto clause of the Constitu-
tion, 43 a law that increases the punishment for a crime cannot be applied
to someone who committed the crime before the enactment of the new
law. 1" Thus, the harsher sentencing scheme will not apply to those who
[defraud savings and loan institutions], that the full weight of the U.S. Government will
be brought to bear on those criminals"); id at S9488 (statement of Sen. San-
ford)(proposed measures are necessary to "ensure that such a debacle can never repeat
itself"); id at S9491 (statement of Sen. Shelby)(proposed legislation "creates a new,
strong deterrent to white collar crime by authorizing life imprisonment for 'S&L king-
pins' "); cf id at S9510 (statement of Sen. Leahy)(legislation "stiffens penalties for S&L-
related fraud, insuring that these white collar criminals will never have another chance to
bilk the American public as they have in the past").
142. For example, referring to an amendment to the Senate bill that, among other
things, "[c]reat[ed] an S&L kingpin statute" and "[r]equir[ed] the U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission to impose stiff, mandatory minimum penalties for major S&L violators," Senator
Biden stated:
Unfortunately, the S&L violators that we have nabbed are spending little time
behind bars. According to a recent study, in 1989 the average S&L offender
received a sentence of just 1.9 years in prison, in comparison, the average bank
robber was sentenced to a prison term of 9.4 years.
The white-collar criminals who are responsible for this massive rip off must
be brought to justice.
And that's exactly what this amendment does.
136 Cong. Rec. S9483 (daily ed. July 11, 1990)(statement of Sen. Biden); see also id. at
S9488 (statement of Sen. Heflin)("This important amendment to the crime bill will make
it easier to apprehend and prosecute those accused of defrauding savings and loan institu-
tions, and easier to seize embezzled savings and loan assets." ); id (statement of Sen.
Sanford)("Mhe amendment makes certain that once these crooks are discovered, they
pay for their wheeling and dealing. The maximum prison term for bank fraud would be
raised to 30 years, fitting the punishment for the serious nature of the crimes of these S&L
high fliers."); id at S9490 (statement of Sen. Shelby)("We tell [the public] that we stiff-
ened the sentences and penalties in FIRREA. But what good does it do if we do not
impose them on anyone?").
143. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9.
144. The Supreme Court has stated that ex post facto laws forbidden by the Constitu-
tion include "[e]very law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed" and "[e]very law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punish-
ment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed." Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386, 390 (1798); see also Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1987) (more
severe sentencing guidelines enacted after commission of crime could not be constitution-
ally applied to defendant); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981) ("The ex postfacto
prohibition forbids the Congress and the States to enact any law 'which imposes a punish-
ment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes
additional punishment to that then prescribed.' ")(footnote omitted)(quoting Cummings
v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 325-26 (1867)). See generally W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal
Law § 2.4 (1986) (explaining federal courts' interpretation of the ex post facto clause).
The U.S. Department of Justice has itself taken the position that the ex post facto clause
bars applying the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to defendants convicted of crimes that
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committed crimes against the savings and loan institutions whose failure
prompted FIRREA and the Crime Control Act. Those individuals will
be subject to the criminal law as it existed prior to 1989. At best, the
enactment of these provisions may subtly influence sentencing judges to
increase the severity of their sentences in savings and loan cases. These
provisions will directly affect only those who commit banking crimes in
the coming years.
In future cases to which the new sentencing provisions do apply, these
provisions will often result in unreasonably harsh sentences. As a gen-
eral matter, most people probably would not agree with Congress that
bank embezzlers deserve harsher punishments than bank robbers. 14 ,
Although the premise for such serious treatment of banking crimes is
that federal taxpayers may have to make up money lost by a federally
insured bank, even criminal conduct that results in direct losses to the
government is not treated so severely. 146
The unfairness of the newly enhanced sentences may be felt most
acutely in cases in which no money is lost at all. As discussed earlier,141
a bank officer may be convicted of misapplication simply for authorizing
a loan in a deceptive manner, even if he correctly believes that the loan
will be repaid. Similarly, a bank customer who obtains a loan through
the use of deception may be convicted of a banking violation even if he
fully intends to, and does, repay the loan. 148 As a consequence, in cases
involving millions of dollars in loans that are repaid, individuals may be
sentenced to a lengthy period of incarceration, even if the bank suffered
no loss. Like the wisdom of plenary prosecution, Congress never ad-
dressed the fairness of the enhanced sentences, but it should have.
IV. DELEGATIONS OF PROSECUTORIAL POWER
Along with providing substantial financial resources for investigating
bank crimes, Congress provided substantial procedural tools to federal
investigators. Some of the procedural options now extended to bank
fraud investigations had previously been employed in investigations of
other crimes that are considered serious. For example, the Crime Con-
trol Act amended the federal wire-tapping statute to add several banking
antedate the adoption of the Guidelines. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prosecutors Handbook on
Sentencing Guidelines and Other Provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, at 68-
69 (1987).
145. A National Law Journal/Lexis Poll conducted between July 7 and 9, 1989 re-
vealed that most people in this country believed that bank embezzlers should be sen-
tenced far less harshly than bank robbers in instances where each took the same amount
of money. See Nat'l L.J., Aug. 7, 1989, at S15, cols. 3-4.
146. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1031 (1988)(Major Fraud Act of 1988)(punishable by fine,
imprisonment of up to ten years, or both); 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1988)(income tax eva-
sion)(punishable by fine, imprisonment of up to five years, or both); see also Federal Sen-
tencing Guideline Manual §§ 2F1.L, 2T1.l (1987)(sentencing guidelines provisions for
violations of fraud and tax evasion statutes).
147. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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crimes149 to the list of crimes that the government may investigate
through the use of wire taps. 5 Other procedural provisions, however,
are far more innovative. The most provocative provisions of FIRREA
and the Crime Control Act are those that radically redistribute responsi-
bility for investigating and prosecuting banking crimes between criminal
authorities, civil authorities and private individuals.
Broadly speaking, the traditional model of federal criminal law en-
forcement drew distinct boundaries between criminal authorities, civil
authorities and private individuals. In many white-collar cases, the con-
duct of an individual or corporation may run afoul of both criminal and
civil provisions. As a consequence, a federal prosecutor, a civil litigator
in the government or a private party may bring an action to enforce these
statutory provisions. s For example, antitrust and securities laws bring
questionable conduct within the purview not only of federal prosecutors
but also of civil authorities such as the SEC, the FTC, or the civil divi-
sion of the Justice Department.' 52 These laws also allow aggrieved pri-
vate parties to bring private causes of action." 3 Nevertheless, civil and
criminal prosecutors do not work as a team, sharing information freely
back and forth. Although civil authorities may provide evidence to pros-
ecutors, 1 4s prosecutors are traditionally barred from disclosing to civil
authorities information gathered in the course of a grand jury investiga-
149. See Crime Control Act, supra note 10, § 2531, 104 Stat. at 4879 (to be codified at
18 U.S.C. § 2516). In general, the "banking law violations" to which the Crime Control
Act and FIRREA relate include violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 215, 656, 657, 1005, 1006,
1007, 1014, and 1344; conspiracies to violate any of those provisions; and mail fraud or
wire fraud violations under §§ 1341 and 1343 "affecting a financial institution." See FIR-
REA, supra note 9, § 964(a), 103 Stat. at 505 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 215).
150. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1988).
The Crime Control Act also authorized federal banking agencies to request the assist-
ance of foreign banking authorities in carrying out their investigations, as well as to lend
assistance to foreign banking authorities that are investigating violations of banking laws
or currency transaction requirements. See Crime Control Act, supra note 10, § 2532, 104
Stat. at 4880 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818).
151. See, eg., United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1970)(upholding criminal
prosecution based on conduct that was the subject of a prior civil proceeding by FDA);
White v. Mapco Gas Prod., 116 F.R.D. 498, 499 (E.D. Ark. 1987)(simultaneous grand
jury investigation and private civil antitrust action).
152. For examples of such statutes, see Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771,
77q(a) (1988); Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78g, 78i, 78j(b), 78m(d), 78m(e),
78n(a), 78n(d), 78n(e) (1988); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 21, 25 (1988).
153. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(a), 77k(a), 771, 78i (1988).
154. See; e.g., SEC v. Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368, 1380 (D.C. Cir.)(n banc)(SEC
permitted to enforce subpoena duces tecum issued pursuant to criminal investigation),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993 (1980). See generally Wilson & Matz, Obtaining Evidence for
Federal Economic Crime Prosecutions: An Overview and Analysis of Investigative Meth-
ods, 14 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 651, 701-09 (1977)(discussing related judicial proceedings
against subjects of "economic crime investigations"); Note, Commingled Civil and Crimi-
nal Proceedings. A Peek at Constitutional Limitations and a Poke at the SEC, 34 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 527, 527 (1966)(SEC has power to use fruits of its investigation in both
civil and criminal proceedings).
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tion. 1 5 The unique evidence-gathering procedures available to criminal
prosecutors are not intended to be used in civil investigations by the gov-
ernment. 156 Moreover, it is especially difficult for private parties to share
in evidence gathered by criminal investigators. When it comes to investi-
gations of banking crimes, however, much has now changed.
A. Delegation of Prosecutorial Power to Civil Authorities
FIRREA and the Crime Control Act break down the boundaries be-
tween criminal prosecutors and civil authorities. FIRREA authorizes
the Attorney General to bring civil proceedings against individuals who
are believed to have committed banking crimes and provides for civil
penalties of $1 million or more.157 In conducting civil investigations,
FIRREA authorizes the Department of Justice to take testimony and
obtain evidence by subpoena.' 58 More importantly, the civil division at-
155. The Supreme Court has interpreted the federal grand-jury secrecy provision, Fed.
R. Crim. P. 6(e), to bar prosecutors from disclosing matters occurring before the grand
jury to civil parties, including civil government authorities, in the absence of a judicial
finding of a "particularized need" for the information. See United States v. Baggot, 463
U.S. 476, 479-80 (1983); United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 434-35 (1983).
156. The Court in Sells noted three dangers of disclosing grand jury materials to gov-
ernment attorneys for civil use: first, such disclosure would "rendero considerably more
concrete the threat to the willingness of witnesses to come forward and to testify fully and
candidly"; second, "[i]f prosecutors in a given case knew that their colleagues would be
free to use the materials generated by the grand jury for a civil case, they might be
tempted to manipulate the grand jury's powerful investigative tools to root out additional
evidence useful in the civil suit, or even to start or continue a grand jury inquiry where no
criminal prosecution seemed likely"; and third, "use of grand jury materials by Govern-
ment agencies in civil or administrative settings threatens to subvert the limitations ap-
plied outside the grand jury context on the Government's powers of discovery and
investigation." Sells, 463 U.S. at 432-33.
The Court cited then-Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard Thornburgh for the
proposition that "it would be a bad idea to allow agency personnel to use grand jury
materials for civil purposes." Id. at 439. In Thornburgh's words, "'The cleanest exam-
ple I can think of where a 6(e) order [a court order for disclosure of grand jury materials]
is clearly required is where a criminal fraud investigation before a grand jury fails to
produce enough legally admissible evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
criminal fraud ensued.'" Id. (quoting Hearings on Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1977)). In the 1977 hearings, Thorn-
burgh also stated that Rule 6(e) "will not permit the Department of Justice to take advan-
tage of or to make disclosures to investigative agents or experts in order to aid other
federal agencies in conducting their own civil or criminal investigations." Hearings on
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1977).
157. See FIRREA, supra note 9, § 951, 103 Stat. at 498 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1833a). The amount of the civil penalty ordinarily will not exceed $1 million. See Id.
§ 951(b)(1), 103 Stat. at 498 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(b)(1)). Where the viola-
tion created gain to the defendant or loss to a bank or other individual or entity, however,
the penalty may be the amount of such gain or loss. See id. § 951(b)(3), 103 Stat. at 498
(to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(b)(3)). The statute also creates an enhanced penalty
in the case of continuing violations. See id. § 951(b)(2), 103 Stat. at 498 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1833a(b)(2)).
158. See id. § 951(f), 103 Stat. at 498-99 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(f)).
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torneys in the Department of Justice may receive freely from criminal
investigators any grand jury information concerning a banking law viola-
tion.15 9 The result is that civil attorneys for the government and criminal
prosecutors may work in tandem in developing evidence.
At first glance, one might question why civil proceedings are needed at
all, given the enforcement philosophy of plenary criminal prosecution
implicit in the recent legislation. If the policy was instead to prosecute
banking crimes selectively, then civil proceedings would have an impor-
tant place in the prosecutorial scheme, as they presently do in cases in-
volving tax, securities and antitrust violations."W For example, even
when it believes a securities violation has occurred, the SEC may exercise
its discretion and decline to refer the case to the prosecutors; or the pros-
ecutors, in the exercise of their discretion, may decline to initiate crimi-
nal charges.1 6 ' A case not considered serious enough to warrant criminal
proceedings may become the subject of a civil lawsuit brought not to
inflict punishment, but to obtain restitution. With banking crimes, how-
ever, a criminal prosecution is expected to be brought in every case in
which the government can prove a crime. Because precisely the same
elements must be proven in a civil as in a criminal case, 162 when would
civil proceedings ever be necessary?
The apparent answer is troubling. A civil proceeding is likely to be
brought against an individual when the evidence of a banking crime is
not considered compelling enough to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt or when a criminal prosecution has already ended in an acquit-
tal.163 Because the burden of proof in a civil proceeding is much lower-
guilt must be established only by a preponderance of the evidence"--an
individual may be successfully tried in a civil proceeding for banking vio-
lations when he cannot be convicted in a criminal prosecution. The civil
proceeding in such a case is basically a criminal proceeding stripped of
such constitutional protections as the presumption of innocence and the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 65 The case will be
brought by government lawyers who are effectively indistinguishable
159. See ia § 964, 103 Stat. at 505 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 215).
160. See supra notes 149-152 and accompanying text.
161. See 0. Obermaier & R_ Morvillo, White Collar Crime: Business and Regulatory
Offenses § 12.04, at 12-34 to 12-35 (1990).
162. By contrast, in securities cases the prosecution must prove willfulness in addition
to all the other elements of a securities law violation. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976).
163. Civil proceedings may also be brought against entities "for whom the only realis-
tic penalty is monetary." Baird, supra note 10, at 24. It is unlikely that a civil proceeding
would be brought after a successful criminal prosecution, because the imposition of a
substantial monetary penalty would likely violate the due process clause. See United
States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1901-02 (1989); Baird, supra note 10, at 24.
164. See FIRREA, supra note 9, § 95 1(e), 103 Stat. at 498 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1833a(e)).
165. In addition, the double jeopardy clause does not apply to civil cases. See Helver-
ing v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1938).
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from criminal prosecutors. It will be based on all the evidence gathered
in a criminal investigation-an opportunity available to government at-
torneys in no other type of civil case.166 And, most significantly, it may
culminate in a fine of up to $1 million without regard to the amounts the
defendant gained or the bank lost. An onerous financial "penalty" that
has no relation to the victim's loss or the wrongdoer's gain is not reme-
dial, but, under any conventional understanding, purely punitive. The
imposition of punitive fines on the basis of a civil verdict may violate not
only societal notions of fairness, but also constitutional norms. 67
B. Delegations of Prosecutorial Power to Private Parties
The recent legislation also breaks down traditional barriers between
government lawyers and private parties by giving private individuals a
financial stake in the outcome of both criminal and civil proceedings
brought by the Government. 6  FIRREA allows federal banking agen-
cies to provide a reward of up to $100,000 to individuals whose informa-
tion about banking violations leads to the recovery of a criminal fine, a
civil penalty, restitution or the forfeiture of assets. 69 This is one of two
principal provisions designed to encourage private individuals to disclose
information to government authorities about banking crimes. The other
is a "whistleblower" provision that protects bank employees from ad-
verse employer action in retaliation for having provided information to
government authorities about banking violations.170 Unlike the
166. See Baird, supra note 10, at 24.
167. See United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1903-04 (1989)(imposition of penal-
ties under the False Claims Act was punitive, and therefore violated the double jeopardy
right of a defendant who had previously been convicted of related criminal offenses); see
also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-51 (1980)(accepting notion that statutory
civil penalties may be so punitive in nature as to violate constitutional norms); Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 167 (1963)(civil sanction of citizenship deprivation
is punitive in nature); Baird, supra note 10, at 24 (discussing FIRREA's "revolutionary
authorization of civil penalties" for certain criminal violations).
168. See FIRREA, supra note 9, § 933, 103 Stat. at 495 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831k); see also Baird, supra note 10, at 21-22 (noting that FIRREA provides for re-
wards for information leading to recovery of more than $50,000 in criminal and civil
penalties).
169. See FIRREA, supra note 9, § 933(b), 103 Stat. at 496 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831k(b)). In addition to the $100,000 cap, the reward may not exceed 25% of the
amount recovered. See id. As originally enacted, this provision permitted an award only
when assets in excess of $50,000 were recovered, but Congress eliminated this limitation
in 1990. See Crime Control Act, supra note 10, § 2586, 104 Stat. at 4903 (to be codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1831k(a)).
Congress had previously instituted similar rewards in securities cases and other kinds
of cases. See, e.g., Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-704, § 3a(2)(e), 102 Stat. 4677, 4679 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
l(e))(amending section 21 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). See generally Baird,
supra note 10, at 21-22 (discussing similar power given to SEC, FBI and IRS by other
statutory provisions).




whistleblower protection, the offer of a financial award creates a substan-
tial risk that, when the informants are also government witnesses at trial,
their stake in the outcome of the case will influence, or at least appear to
influence, their testimony. 7'
The Crime Control Act goes even further in this direction in a subtitle
called the Financial Institutions Anti-Fraud Enforcement Act of 1990,"2
which provides additional financial incentives to informants. This subti-
tle establishes a procedure by which informants may file with the Attor-
ney General a sworn declaration describing facts amounting to a banking
violation.1 73 If the prosecution obtains a criminal conviction because of a
declaration, which both the informant and the Government must keep
confidential, 74 the Act entitles the informant to a reward of between
$5,000 and $100,000 to be paid out of a newly established fund. 75 This
provision increases the risk of biased or even perjured testimony by infor-
mants, because the extent of the informant's cooperation at trial is one of
the factors that the Attorney General considers in determining the
amount of the award.176 Thus, the pay-out will depend not only on
whether a conviction is obtained, but also on how helpful the Attorney
General perceives the informant's contribution at trial to be.
Furthermore, when the government acquires funds or assets in either a
criminal or a civil proceeding as a result of the informant's declaration,
the Crime Control Act entitles the informant to a portion of the amounts
recovered totalling up to 30% of the first $1 million recovered, 20% of
the next $4 million, and 10% of the next $5 million.'" For example, an
171. In some jurisdictions, the rules of professional ethics forbid lawyers from acqui-
escing in the payment of compensation to witnesses contingent on the content of their
testimony or the outcome of the case. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR
7-109(C) (1980). This provision has not been applied to prosecutors, however. Courts
have permitted prosecutors to provide both financial compensation to informants and
other powerful inducements to cooperating witnesses, including immunity from prosecu-
tion. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1972); United States v. Gonzales,
927 F.2d 139, 142-45 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Nixon, 881 F.2d 1305, 1309-11 (5th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Waterman, 732 F.2d 1527, 1531 (8th Cir. 1984), cerL denied,
471 U.S. 1065 (1985). Although commentators have questioned the propriety of such
inducements, see M. Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System 89-90 (1975),
courts view them as a practical necessity and reason that, as long as inducements to
prosecution witnesses are disclosed and may be made the subject of cross-examination,
they do not inexorably undermine the truth-seeking process. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-
55. The rewards established by Congress here differ from the inducements usually pro-
vided to informants because they are contingent on the outcome of criminal cases,
whereas the traditional inducements are usually contingent only upon truthful testimony
and cooperation with the prosecution.
172. See Crime Control Act, supra note 10, §§ 2560-2594, 104 Stat. at 4893-906.
173. See icL §§ 2561-2562, 104 Stat. at 4894.
174. See id § 2563, 104 Stat. at 4894-4895.
175. See id §§ 2565(c), 2569, 104 Stat. at 4896-4898. This provision precludes double
awards for providing the same or substantially the same information. See id. § 2565(e),
104 Stat. at 4897.
176. See id § 2565(c)(2)(E), 104 Stat. at 4896.
177. See id § 2565(d), 104 Stat. at 4896-4897.
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informant whose declaration led to the recovery of $10 million would be
entitled to between $850,000 and $1.6 million, the amount to be deter-
mined by the Attorney General based on the usefulness of the declarant's
information.17 This contrasts with federal statutes, such as RICO, that
allow private parties to bring suits as surrogates of the Government, that
is, as private attorneys general. 179 In the case of banking crimes, the
potential pay-off to informants is so great that federal prosecutors may
appear to be acting as surrogates for private parties, even though the
Government still gets the lion's share of the recovery.
Two provisions of the Crime Control Act that permit prosecutions by
private parties on behalf of the Attorney General further erode the bar-
rier between government lawyers and private parties. The first provision
authorizes the Attorney General to retain private attorneys on a contin-
gent fee basis to investigate and prosecute civil actions for banking viola-
tions. 80 Although the Act does not address whether a private attorney
retained to bring a civil action would be considered an "attorney for the
government," with free access to grand jury information, nothing sug-
gests that she would not be.'
The second provision allows an informant to bring a civil action as a
private contractor on behalf of the Attorney General when the Attorney
General declines to act on the informant's declaration. 18 2 Given the
quasi-criminal characteristics of civil actions for banking violations-i. e.,
the punitive nature of the fines and the unique nature of the investigative
powers afforded to the plaintiff's attorney-the prospect of a private
prosecutor, serving for a contingent fee at the direction of a private party,
is deeply disturbing.
In criminal cases, there is a requirement that the prosecutor be disin-
terested 3 --a requirement that would be violated by appointing counsel
for an interested party to act as a criminal prosecutor 8 4 or by the pay-
ment of a criminal prosecutor on a contingency basis.'8 5 The nominally
178. See id. § 2565(d)(1)(A)(ii), 104 Stat. at 4896 ("[T]he Attorney General may con-
sider ... the usefulness of the information provided."). The Act provides comparable
financial incentives to informants who provide new information about the assets of bank-
ing crime violators against whom the Government has already obtained a final judgment
or settlement. See id. §§ 2576-2585, 104 Stat. at 4899-903. This does not, however, raise
a significant risk that defendants will be tried and convicted based on biased, and possibly
perjurious, testimony.
179. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
180. See Crime Control Act, supra note 10, § 2588, 104 Stat. at 4905.
181. If a private attorney acting on behalf of the Attorney General does not automati-
cally share in the grand jury's evidence, the attorney might still obtain a court order
under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(i) authorizing the disclosure of grand jury information.
182. See Crime Control Act, supra note 10, § 2567, 104 Stat. at 4898.
183. See Young v. United States ex reL Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 803-08
(1987).
184. See id.
185. Cf. Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1977)justice of the peace who
received a $5 fee for each search warrant issued was not "neutral and detached," as
required to satisfy the fourth amendment).
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civil actions for banking violations are so much like criminal actions that
the use of interested prosecutors seems to violate customary notions of
fairness, if not due process.'" 6
V. THE EXPANSION OF INVESTIGATIVE SECRECY
A. Grand Jury Secrecy Provisions of FIRREA
FIRREA contains provisions designed to protect the integrity of grand
jury investigations of banking crimes. Ostensibly, Congress designed
these provisions to prevent the grand jury's suspects and targets from
learning about, and interfering with, the grand jury's efforts. Prior to the
adoption of these provisions, many banks had notified customers volun-
tarily of grand jury subpoenas."17 Only in the rare case in which disclo-
sure would jeopardize an investigation could a prosecutor obtain a court
order directing the bank to delay giving notice.' FIRREA eliminates
the need for such a court order, however, when the grand jury is investi-
gating banking crimes.
FIRREA provides that when a bank receives a subpoena in connection
with the grand jury's investigation of a specified banking crime, neither
the bank nor its directors, officers, employees or agents may notify the
person named in the subpoena of the existence or contents of the sub-
poena or the information furnished by the bank in response to the sub-
186. There is a risk, for example, that where a disinterested government lawyer would
agree to settle a case, a private attorney paid on a contingent fee basis or an attorney for
an interested party would forge ahead to promote the attorney's or the private client's
own interest. This raises a spectre of unfairness that is not present in actions under RICO
or securities law, for example, in which the private plaintiff is said to be acting as a
"private attorney general." In such an action, the private party is seeking to redress
injuries to itself as well as to the public; the private party has a cause of action whether or
not the government proceeds in its own right. Under the Crime Control Act, in contrast,
the private action takes the place of a government lawsuit and may not be brought if the
government itself decides to proceed. See Crime Control Act, supra note 10, §§ 2588-
2592, 104 Stat. at 4905-06. Thus, only in cases involving banking crimes would the gov-
ernment's decision not to bring an action potentially result in harsher treatment of a
defendant.
187. FIRREA House Report, supra note 57, at 471, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News, at 267.
188. Prior to 1986, some courts issued such orders pursuant to their inherent author-
ity, but others did not. See J. Villa, supra note 16, § 9.08[10], at 9-51 n.35 (citing cases).
In 1986, Congress authorized courts to issue such orders based on the following specific
findings: the government agency seeking the records must have jurisdiction over the in-
vestigation; the records sought must be "relevant to a legitimate law enforcement in-
quiry"; and notice would result in "endangering life or physical safety of any person[,]
flight from prosecution[,] destruction of or tampering with evidence[,] intimidation of
potential witnesseso] or otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or official pro-
ceeding or unduly delaying a trial or ongoing official proceeding." 12 U.S.C. § 3409(a)
(1988). See generally Bloch, Gagging Bankers. Grand Jury Nondisclosure Statutes and the
First Amendment, 107 Banking L.J. 441, 446 (1990)("after 1986, federal prosecutors
could obtain an ex parte order postponing customer notification 90 days if they showed a
judge, 'with reasonable specificity,' that the bank records sought were relevant"); L
Fischer, The Law of Financial Privacy § 2.04[7], at 2-47 (1983)(same); J. Villa, supra
note 16, § 9.06[l], at 9-31 to 9-32 (same).
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poena.' 9 This prohibition is enforced by criminal sanctions. 190 A new
criminal obstruction-of-justice provision makes it a crime, punishable by
up to a year in prison, for a bank officer to reveal to a bank customer or
to anyone else named in the subpoena that the bank has received a grand
jury subpoena in connection with an investigation of specified banking
crimes.1 9' Moreover, if the officer makes such disclosure "with the intent
to obstruct a judicial proceeding," a court may sentence the officer to a
maximum of five years' imprisonment.192
The new nondisclosure provisions raise a number of questions. One
commentator1 93 has questioned the constitutionality of these provisions
in light of the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Butterworth v. Smith.194
In that case, the Court invoked the first amendment to strike down a
state law forbidding grand jury witnesses from disclosing the content of
their testimony.1 95
Questions also arise as to whether the nondisclosure provisions, as
drafted, are an appropriate way of foreclosing banks and bank officials
from notifying suspects of grand jury subpoenas issued in the course of
investigations of banking crimes. One of the most glaring statutory infir-
mities is that these provisions do not require prosecutors to give banks
fair notice of which subpoenas are and are not issued in connection with
banking crime investigations.' 96 If a bank official notifies a customer be-
cause he reasonably believes that the particular subpoena was issued in
connection with the grand jury's investigation of crimes other than bank-
ing crimes, that official has nevertheless committed a crime. 197 Also
troublesome is that, in certain circumstances, compliance with these pro-
visions may require bank officials to lie to their customers. Suppose, for
example, that a customer asks a bank officer point blank whether the
grand jury has subpoenaed the bank for the customer's records. If the
bank has been subpoenaed in connection with an investigation of banking
crimes, the officer cannot respond truthfully by answering in the affirma-
tive. Moreover, if the bank usually gives notice of grand jury subpoenas
in cases not involving banking crimes, then an evasive answer may be
189. See FIRREA, supra note 9, § 943, 103 Stat. at 497-98 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1290(c)); J. Villa, supra note 16, § 9.09, at 9-60.




193. See Bloch, supra note 188, at 448.
194. 110 S. Ct. 1376 (1990).
195. See id. at 1383.
196. For example, grand jury subpoenas that refer only to the mail fraud statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1341 (1988), or to the conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988), may or may
not relate to an investigation of banking crimes, and a bank official would have no way of
knowing from the face of the subpoena.
197. The misdemeanor provision has no intent requirement; it is a strict liability of-




understood as an affirmation. This would apparently violate the misde-
meanor provision, which forbids notifying customers indirectly as well as
directly. The bank's only option, then, might be to lie by denying the
receipt of a subpoena.
Rather than looking at the nondisclosure provisions from the perspec-
tive of constitutional analysis or statutory construction, this Article ex-
plores two questions relating to the prudence and necessity of Congress's
efforts. First, is it in fact important to preserve the secrecy of grand jury
investigations of banking crimes and will silencing the banks and their
officials meaningfully promote this aim? Second, is it appropriate to bur-
den banks with an obligation of secrecy that is not placed on any other
class of grand jury witnesses, thereby singling out banks to play a special
role in aid of criminal law enforcement?
B. The Need for Investigative Secrecy
and the Feasibility of Preserving It
The requirement that banks keep grand jury subpoenas secret during
investigations of banking crimes 9 ' reflects a view that investigative se-
crecy is needed in these cases and that silencing bank officials will pro-
mote grand jury secrecy. Ordinarily, prosecutors seek orders directing
banks not to disclose their receipt of grand jury subpoenas in order to
keep secret the very fact that an investigation is underway. By taking
this and other special steps to preserve the secrecy of their investigations,
the prosecutors hope to prevent particular suspects from either fleeing
the jurisdiction or obstructing an investigation by, for example, threaten-
ing potential witnesses or destroying or falsifying documents.199 Thus,
prosecutors have typically sought nondisclosure orders in racketeering
and narcotics cases-cases involving particularly unscrupulous or violent
individuals-rather than in cases involving business crimes.
The grand jury secrecy provisions of FIRREA do not serve the usual
purposes of nondisclosure orders. Maintaining the secrecy of on-going
investigations would be impossible in the case of the banking crimes with
which Congress was concerned in 1989-the crimes that supposedly
caused the failure of savings and loan institutions. Federal prosecutors
and agents obviously will be scrutinizing every failed thrift; Congress has
mandated that they do so. Furthermore, there is little likelihood that
potential defendants will obstruct banking crime investigations."°° On
198. White-collar defendants are less likely to employ violence, and arc therefore less
likely to have efflective ways of obstructing the government's access to witnesses. They
are also more likely to have a defensible case in the absence of obstruction, and thus for
them the risk that unlawful acts of obstruction will be discovered outweighs the potential
benefits of obstruction.
199. See 12 U.S.C. § 3409 (1988); J. Villa, supra note 16, § 9.06[l], at 9-31.
200. Recognizing that defendants in bank fraud cases are unlikely to flee or obstruct
justice, courts have generally permitted their release on bail pending trial, even over the
prosecution's strong protest. See eg., Judge Allows Bail for a Banker Charged in a Yir-
ginia Fraud Case, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1991, at 36, col. I (defendant facing up to 425
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the contrary, if Congress were to legislate on the basis of a presumption
that particular types of grand jury investigations are prone to obstruc-
tion, the presumption would be far more appropriate in narcotics, racke-
teering or obstruction-of-justice investigations, and particularly
inappropriate in banking crime cases. It was therefore specious for the
House Report to justify the nondisclosure provisions on the basis that
they spared prosecutors from "expending precious resources to obtain
non-disclosure notices" in bank-crime cases.20 In banking crime cases,
prosecutors would rarely be able to establish that disclosure would seri-
ously jeopardize or unduly delay the grand jury's investigation, the stan-
dard under prior law for obtaining a nondisclosure order.20 2  The only
way to explain these nondisclosure provisions, then, is to posit that they
are designed to serve a far different purpose than traditional nondisclo-
sure orders: these provisions are not so much intended to keep the grand
jury's targets in the dark as they are to keep the targets' lawyers in the
dark. The way in which important bank-crime cases are typically de-
fended gives a basis for understanding the nondisclosure provisions. An-
ticipating that they would be placed under investigation, many bank
officials will have hired lawyers well before the grand jury ever began its
inquiry.2 3 The initial goal of these white-collar defense lawyers, as Ken-
neth Mann describes in his book Defending White-Collar Crime,2" is to
forestall an indictment, often by limiting the government's access to in-
formation.20 5 To this end, it is important to know how far the govern-
ment has progressed in order to keep one step ahead of it.2"6
Even if the nondisclosure provisions do not keep secret that a grand
jury investigation is underway, they do keep secret the pace at which the
particular grand jury is progressing. By doing so, the nondisclosure pro-
visions do not meaningfully protect against flight or obstruction of jus-
tice. They do, however, impede the efforts that defense lawyers might
lawfully undertake in the pre-indictment stage of a banking crime case to
keep abreast of the prosecutor's investigation.20 7 The nondisclosure pro-
years imprisonment and $20 million in fines on 83 counts of conspiracy, fraud, misappli-
cation and making false statements, was released on $150,000 bail over the prosecution's
objection).
201. See FIRREA House Report, supra note 57, at 471, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News, at 267.
202. See 12 U.S.C. § 3409 (1988).
203. See, e.g., S&L Bar in Houston Bracesfor the Attack, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 28, 1991, at 8,
col. 1 (two attorneys have been advising former thrift executives "for at least three years
... in anticipation of criminal prosecutions").
204. K. Mann, Defending White-Collar Crime (1985).
205. See id. at 6.
206. See id. at 85-89.
207. At times, the investigative efforts described by Professor Mann veer toward, and
possibly over, the line of what is ethical and lawful. See, e.g., Green, Zealous Representa-
tion Bound: The Intersection of the Ethical Codes and the Criminal Law, 69 N.C.L. Rev.
687, 690-704 (1991)(discussing problems posed under ethical codes and criminal obstruc-
tion-of-justice provisions by a white-collar defense attorney's efforts to convince an un-
represented witness to assert the fifth amendment privilege in the grand jury).
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visions impinge particularly on the legitimate efforts of defense counsel in
cases in which a bank and an officer or customer named in the grand jury
subpoena are targets of the investigation."' In such a case, the bank's
lawyer would ordinarily want to discuss the subpoena with the lawyer for
the customer or officer named in it, and might even want to enter into a
joint defense agreement. 2°9 The bank's lawyer apparently cannot do so,
however, without violating the new nondisclosure provisions. As this ex-
ample illustrates, these provisions promote grand jury investigations pri-
marily by impeding generally lawful efforts by criminal defense lawyers
prior to indictment.
C. The Bank's Role in Assisting Criminal Investigations
Banks are unquestionably an important source of evidence concerning
banking crimes. A bank that is the victim of a possible crime will possess
the documents that reflect the banking transactions that are at the heart
of the criminal investigation. Other banks may have documents reflect-
ing the complicated flow of funds that often characterizes criminal activ-
ity directed at banks by white-collar defendants. It does not necessarily
follow, however, that Congress should obligate banks to assist law en-
forcement authorities to a degree far greater than other potential wit-
nesses. The nondisclosure provisions are simply one example, and
certainly not the most dramatic, of how, over the past two decades, Con-
gress and federal regulators have gradually turned banks into quasi-depu-
ties to federal law enforcement officials. 210  Federal legislation and
administrative regulations now require banks to facilitate criminal inves-
tigations by taking a variety of affirmative measures that go well beyond
simply responding to lawful process. The result has been an alteration of
banks' traditional relationship with their customers and, especially, a
208. See Carberry, Production of Documents by Financial Institution Pursuant to a
Federal Grand Jury Subpoena, printed in American Bankers Association & American Bar
Association Section of Criminal Justice, Money Laundering Enforcement Update: Legis-
lative, Regulatory, Enforcement Developments and Policy Implications 506, 513 (Sept.
24-25, 1990) [hereinafter Money Laundering Enforcement Update]. Mr. Carberry teaches
White Collar Crime as a member of the adjunct faculty of Fordhan University School of
Law and is a partner in the New York office of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue.
209. Cf. United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989)(attorney-client
privilege protects statements that a represented party makes to another party's lawyer
pursuant to "a joint defense effort or strategy [that] has been decided upon and under-
taken by the parties and their respective counsel").
210. Cf Large Bank Training to Detect Suspicious Transactions, printed in Money
Laundering Enforcement Update, supra note 208, at 635 (outline for a "Suspicious Trans-
action Training Program"); Loeser, Developing Internal Systems for Reporting Possibly
Suspicious Activity-Reporting Requirements Within an Institution, printed in Money
Laundering Enforcement Update, supra note 208, at 641, 645 (discussion of how to estab-
lish good compliance procedures and practices in a multi-bank holding company system).
The traditional view within government has been that imposing investigatory burdens
on banks is fair, both because banks are profitable enough to sustain those burdens finan-
cially and because banks receive a reciprocal benefit in the form of depository insurance.
Cf. L. Fischer, supra note 188, § 4.01, at 4-2 to 4-3.
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limitation on the traditional obligation of banks to preserve the confiden-
tiality of their customers' records. 211
Prior to 1970, banks had an obligation to assist law enforcement au-
thorities not substantially different from that of other businesses. Banks
recorded their transactions almost exclusively for internal purposes; for
example, records of cancelled checks were kept to protect against losses
or false claims.212 Bank customers could reasonably assume that records
of their transactions, which might reveal substantial detail about their
private lives, would be kept confidential.21 3 Banks generally would not
disclose customer records to the government on their own initiative214 or
211. The obligation of bank secrecy has been traced as far back as the Rules of Banco
Ambrosiano Milano of 1593. See Huhs, To Disclose or Not to Disclose Customer Records,
108 Banking L.J. 30, 30 n.3 (1991). In this country, courts have found a bank's duty to
maintain the confidentiality of its customers' records to be an implicit term of its contract
with its customers. See, eg., Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d 759, 762 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1969)(cause of action for "violation of an implied duty on the part of a
national bank not to disclose information negligently, wilfully or maliciously or intention-
ally to third parties, concerning the depositor's account"); Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq.
386, 390, 146 A. 34, 36 (1929)(bank obligation to withhold customer records absent court
order); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 588, 367 P.2d 284, 290
(1961)(breach of implied contract for bank to disclose information about depositor ac-
count). See generally Huhs, supra, at 31-36 (citing cases that have found implied duty of
confidentiality); 10 Am. Jur. 2d Banks § 332 (1963)("[I]t is an implied term of the con-
tract between a banker and his customer that the banker will not divulge to third persons
... any information relating to the customer acquired through the keeping of his account
... unless compelled to do so by court order."). But see Barnett Bank v. Hooper, 498 So.
2d 923, 925 (Fla. 1986)("[W]here a bank becomes involved in a transaction with a cus-
tomer with whom it has established a relationship of trust and confidence, and it is a
transaction from which the bank is likely to benefit at the customer's expense, the bank
may be found to have assumed a duty to disclose facts material to the transaction, pecu-
liarly within its knowledge, and not otherwise available to the customer," even if the
material facts relate to another depositor's account.) Courts have also found that an
obligation of confidentiality may arise out of a fiduciary relationship between a bank and
its customer. See, e.g., Dolton v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 642 P.2d 21, 23-24
(Colo. Ct. App. 1981)(fiduciary relationship between borrower and lender "where there is
a repose of trust by the customer along with an acceptance or invitation of such trust on
the part of the lending institution"); Huhs, supra, at 36-37, 46-49 (discussing fiduciary
relationship).
212. See Hearings on HR. 15073 Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency,
91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 72-74, 320-21, 340 (1969-1970). Prior to the advent of pho-
tocopying, the information recorded concerning checks was limited. See R. Chorley,
Law of Banking 112-14 (4th ed. 1960); A. Fiske, The Modem Bank 79 (1904); see also
United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 67 F. Supp. 616, 619 (S.D. Ala. 1946)(bank wished to
withhold records of parties not under investigation).
213. See generally Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 247, 529 P.2d 590, 596,
118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 172 (1975)(bank records reveal virtual biography of depositors; per-
mitting access by law enforcement officials on mere request opens the door to unlimited
abuses of police power).
214. The principal exception was that, pursuant to federal regulations first adopted in
1949 and subsequently amended, see 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1990), the Secretary of the
Treasury required financial institutions to report unusually large currency transactions.
See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 37-38 & n.12 (1974).
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even upon informal request.215 A federal prosecutor seeking to obtain
internal bank records might do so by the use of grand jury subpoenas or
court orders,216 but might find that the bank had not in fact kept the kind
of records that he sought.21 7 Moreover, when the prosecution did use
judicial process successfully to obtain customer records, banks could ad-
vise the customer of the government's action, and typically did So. 2
18
Although challenges to grand jury subpoenas were rarely undertaken
and would almost invariably fail, disclosure to the customer at least pro-
vided notice of the government's intrusion into the customer's affairs.
This disclosure reaffirmed that, to the extent the law allowed, the cus-
tomer and the bank still enjoyed a relationship of trust and confidence.
In essence, the law prior to 1970 permitted a bank, like any other com-
mercial enterprise, to further its own commercial interests by protecting
the confidentiality of its relations with its customers.
In 1970, however, Congress enacted the Bank Secrecy Act,21 9 thereby
significantly altering the relationship between banks and their customers.
Recognizing that bank records may assist criminal investigators, prose-
cutors and, to a lesser extent, civil agencies of government, Congress au-
thorized the Secretary of the Treasury to direct financial institutions to
create and preserve a variety of records." Moreover, Congress author-
ized the Secretary to enact regulations requiring financial institutions to
report certain transactions in currency," 1 thereby imposing a financial
burden that banks would not customarily have borne for their own pur-
poses.2" Since the mid-1970s, when the Supreme Court rebuffed chal-
215. Nevertheless, some banks did allow inspections of records on an informal basis.
See Shultz, 416 U.S. at 96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
216. See H.R Rep. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 4394, 4395; S. Rep. No. 1139, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970).
217. See H.R. Rep. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 4394, 4395-96.
218. See FIRREA House Report, supra note 57, at 471, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News, at 267; cf. Chapman, Compliance Without Risk- Processing Re-
questsfor Bank Customer Information, I Banking L. Rev. 21, 22 (1989) (financial institu-
tions notify customers about subpoenas even if not required to do so by state law).
219. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b,
1951-1959 (1988) and 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1062 (recodified at §§ 5311-5312), 1081-1083
(recodified at § 5313), 1101-1105 (recodified at §§ 5316-5318, 5321), 1121-1122 (recodi-
fled at § 5314) (1988)).
220. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b(a)(2), 1951 (1988); 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (1988). See gener-
ally California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 27-30 (1974)(failure of some larger
banks to retain records seriously impairs enforcement of federal criminal, tax and regula-
tory laws); id at 80-81 n.I (Douglas, J., dissenting)(proponents of the Bank Secrecy Act
argued effectiveness of financial record-keeping in attacking criminal activity).
221. See 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (1988) (formerly codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1081 (1976)).
This reporting requirement differs from those imposed on many other regulated indus-
tries in that its purpose was to promote investigations of the business's customers, not to
facilitate oversight of the business making the report.
222. Although Congress granted the Secretary of the Treasury broad authority, it in-
tended to limit the financial burden on banks by requiring the creation and preservation
of only those records that were ordinarily kept by most banks voluntarily. See H.R. Rep.
No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
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lenges to the Bank Secrecy Act brought in turn by a bank223 and by a
bank customer,2 the banks' record-keeping and reporting requirements
have become more onerous.225
In addition, statutes enacted in the 1980s have further expanded the
banks' law enforcement role. Although not specifically directed at finan-
cial institutions, these statutes have prompted banks to increase volun-
tary disclosures of information about their customers to criminal
investigators.226 The increased disclosure requirements have trans-
News 4394, 4396. For the most part, the recordkeeping initially mandated by the Secre-
tary was consistent with that intent. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.33 (1972)(requiring records of
transfers of more than $10,000 to or from United States). On the other hand, the report-
ing requirement initially adopted by the Secretary, which called for financial institutions
to report transactions involving more than $10,000 in currency, see 31 C.F.R. § 103.22
(1972), clearly added to the bank's financial burden.
223. See Schultz, 416 U.S. at 25. The Court found that the recordkeeping and report-
ing requirements were a reasonable exercise of congressional commerce power, and that
the interest of banks and their customers in the privacy of bank records was not constitu-
tionally protected. See id. at 77. The Court's ruling came over the strong dissenting
opinions of three Justices, who viewed the recordkeeping and reporting requirements as
unwarranted intrusions on privacy. See id. at 79-91 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 91-93
(Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 93-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As Justice Douglas put
it, this country's banks were being saddled with "an estimated bill of over $6 million a
year to spy on their customers." Id. at 86 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
224. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
225. See, eg., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181; 31
C.F.R. § 103.33(b) (1990).
Although the public reacted strongly against the Supreme Court's rulings in the mid-
1970's, and Congress responded by enacting the Right to Financial Privacy Act to pro-
tect the privacy of financial records, see 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (1978), the limits that the Act
placed on the disclosure of financial records to the federal government did not generally
apply in the criminal context. See generally L. Fischer, supra note 188, § 2.01, at 2-7
(Justice Department lobbied intensively for changes to facilitate investigation and prose-
cution of crime). The reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act went unchanged,
see 12 U.S.C. § 3413(d) (1978), and Congress specifically permitted banks to take the
initiative to notify the government of possible statutory and regulatory violations. See Id.
§ 3403(c). Moreover, although customers were generally guaranteed notice before their
financial records could be obtained, the government was permitted to dispense with no-
tice before obtaining bank records pursuant to a grand jury subpoena. See id. § 3413(i).
See generally L. Fischer, supra note 188, § 2.03[4], at 2-19 (ironically, bank customers are
awarded certain procedural protections of confidentiality after disclosure of information
to grand jury).
226. In 1984, Congress amended the provisions for forfeiture of proceeds from racke-
teering and narcotics dealing to provide for the forfeiture of tainted property transferred
to third parties, unless the third party can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
it was a bona fide purchaser and that it was reasonably without cause to be aware of the
crimes that gave rise to the forfeiture. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1988); 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(6) (1988); United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1986). In 1986, the Money Laundering Control Act made it a crime to engage in
certain financial transactions involving the proceeds of specified crimes. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1956-57 (1988). The government has made it clear that, to avoid forfeitures and crim-
inal liability under the money-laundering statutes, financial institutions must monitor
their customers' activity more closely and increase their voluntary reports of suspicious
transactions. See Letter from Gerald L. Hilsher, Deputy Asst. Sec'y of the Treasury, to
Richard Ketchum, Director of Office of Market Regulation, Securities and Exchange
Commission (Aug. 12, 1988), printed in Money Laundering Enforcement Update, supra
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formed the traditional bank-customer relationship, which had once been
viewed as a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship, into almost an ad-
versarial one. Banks, acting as agents of the prosecution, are now called
upon to monitor their customers' activity for criminal wrongdoing. m7
For potential customers who value the traditional relationship, that
transformation may make this nation's banks a considerably less attrac-
tive alternative to banks in countries that have preserved their tradition
of bank secrecy.
So far, there has been little public debate about the wisdom of what
some refer to as the "deputization" of banks-a development of which
FIRREA's nondisclosure provisions are just one small part- Banks
themselves, wanting to appear to be "good corporate citizens," have been
reluctant to seriously challenge this development. Their reluctance is
gradually being eroded, however. For example, a recent proposal by the
Treasury Department to require monitoring of, and disclosure of various
information about, international wire transfers has met considerable
resistance based on the cost that this obligation would impose on smaller
financial institutions and the marginal utility of this information to law
enforcement officials. 2" It is beyond the scope of this Article to do more
than raise this important question: given the ill-health of this country's
financial institutions, does it make sense to keep adding to the banks'
obligation to assist law enforcement officials in ways that impose a con-
siderable cost on banks-a cost measured both in administrative ex-
penses and in lost customers?
CONCLUSION
The banking crime legislation that has followed in the wake of the
savings and loan crisis proceeds from Congress's conclusion that crimi-
nal conduct was a principal cause of the crisis. This conclusion was, at
best, premature. But even were Congress clearly right, its response
note 208, at 301-303. While banks had previously been expected to report crimes when
the bank was the victim, see J. Villa, supra note 16, § 2.01, at 2-3, the new laws, together
with new regulations following in their wake, cause financial institutions to probe their
customers' possible involvement in crimes unrelated to the bank. See 12 C.F.R. § 21.11
(1990).
227. Some banks initially reacted against this role change by failing to file the required
Currency Transaction Reports, but since the well-publicized prosecution of the Bank of
New England in the mid-1980's, see United States v. Bank of New Eng., N.A., 821 F.2d
844 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987), banks have generally followed the filing
requirements.
228. See. eg., Letter from Randy Erdmann, Citizens State Bank, to Amy Rudnick,
Director, Office of Financial Enforcement, Department of the Treasury (Nov. 10,
1989)(funds transferred from foreign banks that lack required information must be re-
turned); Letter of Ada R. Harris, First National Bank of Lucedale, to Amy Rudnick
(Nov. 9, 1989)(information obtained is redundant and does not justify added burden on
bank); Letter from M. M. Pouliot, Eastern Heights State Bank, to Amy Rudnick (Nov. 6,
1989)("useless currency reporting" would burden overseas employees of U.S. companies);
Letter from Joseph C. Stennett, Jr., Copiah Bank, N.A., to Amy Rudnick (Nov. 10,
1989)(lack of resources to determine required information).
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would still be troubling. In the short term, the recent legislation will
drain enormous resources from other enterprises, such as the investiga-
tion and prosecution of other serious crimes, to enable federal authorities
to attempt to prosecute every case in which a banking crime was commit-
ted. The harsh sentences now mandated for those convicted of banking
crimes will have no impact on those who committed crimes against failed
savings and loan institutions. And the well-being of the financial institu-
tions that this legislation is supposed to protect is undermined by the
sweeping obligation it imposes on banks to promote the secrecy of grand
jury investigations, an obligation that comes at the expense of the legiti-
mate interests of bank customers and officials who the grand jury may
investigate, as well as at the expense of the bank itself.
The long-term impact of this legislation, however, may prove to be the
most dramatic. The legislation breaks down long-standing boundaries
between federal criminal prosecutors, who wield enormous investigative
power, and civil authorities and private parties, who have not been per-
mitted to share in the prosecutorial power. This innovation is presently
limited to banking crime cases, but, as we know, Congress often legislates
one step at a time. If Congress were to extend the recent changes to all
federal business crimes, the impact on federal investigations and prosecu-
tions-and on the defense of white-collar defendants-would be enor-
mous. It remains to be seen whether the banking crime legislation
signals the beginning of a revolution in federal criminal law enforcement
or whether, once the rhetoric dies down and there is an opportunity for
deeper consideration, aspects of the recent legislation will come to be
recognized as excessive.
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